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BEYOND SCHOOL FINANCE: REFOCUSING EDUCATION 
REFORM LITIGATION TO REALIZE THE DEFERRED 
DREAM OF EDUCATION EQUALITY AND ADEQUACY 
ABSTRACT 
The academic achievement gap between poor, minority students and their 
wealthier white peers has been one of the most troubling and persistent policy 
problems in the United States throughout its history. For the past forty years, 
education reformers have turned to the courts to increase educational 
opportunities for minority and impoverished children by increasing their 
access to funding. Success in court has been mixed. While the Supreme Court’s 
decision in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez foreclosed 
the possibility of a federal right to equalized education expenditures, education 
reform plaintiffs in many states have been able to secure a state constitutional 
right to equalized education funding. Yet, despite these judicial victories, 
education reformers have failed to achieve their ultimate goal of equalizing 
educational opportunity. A substantial achievement gap that cuts along racial 
and socioeconomic lines still exists. Thus, the focus on disparities in education 
expenditures appears misplaced. 
This Comment proposes that litigants should redirect their attention to 
challenging inequitable or inadequate distributions of skill-based education 
inputs at the local level. This new approach is superior to the current focus on 
school finance challenges because researchers have increasingly found that 
skill-based inputs, such as teacher quality, are substantially related to 
improved academic outcomes. The approach this Comment proposes is also 
superior to finance suits because courts should be more receptive to these 
locally focused challenges, which raise fewer justiciability concerns than 
school finance suits. Accordingly, these new claims have the potential to lead 
to greater success in the courtroom and the classroom. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Education inequality and inadequacy have plagued American society for 
years in a phenomenon that is commonly referred to as the achievement gap.1 
This academic achievement gap cuts along racial and socioeconomic lines, and 
it appears to be growing wider.2 Poor, minority students continue to perform 
academically at much lower levels than wealthier, white students.3 While 
publicly provided education has traditionally been seen as an equalizing force 
between the rich and poor, analysis of the achievement gap suggests that the 
current public education system is having the opposite effect.4 Although poor 
black and Hispanic students often enter school less prepared than their white 
peers, the gap between these groups actually increases over the course of a 
student’s academic career.5 
The idea that the achievement gap widens while students are receiving their 
formal education seems counterintuitive. However, it becomes less surprising 
when one considers that poor, minority students generally are taught by the 
least qualified teachers and are put in classes that teach the least challenging 
curriculum.6 The resulting achievement disparity is shocking. As one education 
policy organization observed, “17-year-old African American and Latino 
students have skills in English, math, and science similar to those of 13-year-
old Whites.”7 
Education reformers have often turned to the courts for help in closing this 
achievement gap.8 In pursuit of this goal, reform-oriented plaintiffs have had 
an almost single-minded focus in their litigation over the past forty years—
 
 1 Sabrina Tavernise, Poor Dropping Further Behind Rich in School, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2012, at A1. 
 2 Sean F. Reardon, The Widening Academic Achievement Gap Between the Rich and the Poor: New 
Evidence and Possible Explanations, in WHITHER OPPORTUNITY? 91, 94–95 (Greg J. Duncan & Richard J. 
Murnane eds., 2011). 
 3 See infra Part II.A; see also Reardon, supra note 2, at 94–95. 
 4 See Richard J. Murnane et al., Understanding Trends in the Black–White Achievement Gaps During 
the First Years of School, in BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON URBAN AFFAIRS 97, 98–99 (Gary Burtless & 
Janet Rothenberg Pack eds., 2006); Meredith Phillips et al., Does the Black–White Test Score Gap Widen After 
Children Enter School?, in THE BLACK–WHITE TEST SCORE GAP 229, 229–33 (Christopher Jencks & Meredith 
Phillips eds., 1998). 
 5 See Murnane et al., supra note 4, at 98–99; Phillips et al., supra note 4, at 229–33. 
 6 See infra text accompanying notes 105–08. 
 7 Press Release, Educ. Trust, States Can Close the Achievement Gap by Decade’s End (Mar. 2, 2001), 
available at http://www.edtrust.org/dc/press-room/press-release/states-can-close-the-achievement-gap-by-
decades-end-new-education-trust-. 
 8 See infra Part II. 
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increasing the amount of funding available to educate poor, minority students.9 
However, their dogged persistence has failed to achieve equity and adequacy, 
despite numerous judicial decisions in their favor.10 Minority students in the 
twelfth grade still perform academically at the level of white students in the 
eighth grade.11 This is true even in states where education reform plaintiffs 
have won major judicial victories that led to increased education spending for 
poor, minority students.12 
The fact that the achievement gap persists in states where school finance 
litigants have won judicial victories suggests that more money does not ensure 
greater educational outcomes. For that reason, this Comment challenges the 
assumption that the best way to improve academic achievement and reduce 
inequality is through education finance litigation. Rather than maintain a 
single-minded focus on statewide education appropriations, this Comment 
argues that education reform litigants should shift their attention to challenging 
local policies that cause an inequitable or inadequate distribution of skill-based 
education inputs, such as teachers. The widely used school district policy of 
laying off teachers based exclusively on lack of seniority is an example of one 
such policy that education reform litigants should challenge. This new 
litigation approach is advisable because research increasingly shows that 
teachers are the most important variable in closing the achievement gap 
between middle-class and poor students.13 
Education reform litigants can use state constitutional jurisprudence 
developed in school finance cases to bring these types of claims throughout the 
country. This may even be true in states that have found finance challenges 
nonjusticiable on the grounds that finance claims inappropriately require courts 
to substitute their judgment for the legislature’s concerning statewide 
appropriations. Because the claims this Comment proposes are focused on 
local school districts and do not directly challenge statewide legislative 
appropriations, reformers may enjoy success in states that have held that 
school finance challenges are nonjusticiable. 
This Comment proceeds in five parts. Part I discusses the different 
approaches education reform litigants have taken over the past forty years in 
 
 9 See infra Part I.A–C. 
 10 See infra Part I. 
 11 See Alfinio Flores, Examining Disparities in Mathematics Education: Achievement Gap or 
Opportunity Gap?, HIGH SCH. J., Oct.–Nov. 2007, at 29, 30; Press Release, Educ. Trust, supra note 7. 
 12 See infra text accompanying notes 112–18. 
 13 See infra Part III.A. 
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challenging state education finance systems, and it introduces the federal and 
state constitutional jurisprudence related to education rights. Part II 
demonstrates the failure of school finance litigation to improve the academic 
achievement of poor, minority students, suggesting that a focus on increasing 
education expenditures is insufficient to achieve equality and adequacy in 
education. 
Part III presents evidence that skill-based education inputs are the most 
important variables in improving academic outcomes and argues that education 
reform litigants should focus their efforts on challenging policies that result in 
unequal or inadequate distributions of these resources. In particular, Part III 
offers seniority-based teacher layoffs as an example of a policy that education 
reform litigants should challenge, and it concludes by discussing an instance 
where this policy was successfully enjoined in California. Part IV then 
analyzes whether litigation similar to the California suit would be viable in 
other states, given that most education rights suits are now based on state 
constitutional provisions, which may differ significantly between states. Part 
IV ultimately argues that courts throughout the country would likely recognize 
claims challenging inequitable or inadequate distributions of skill-based inputs. 
Finally, Part V focuses on remedies, proposing that courts that find for 
plaintiffs in these cases should limit their intervention to declaratory relief, but 
should also grant injunctive relief when circumstances indicate that declaratory 
relief will not spur swift reform. 
I. FORTY YEARS OF SCHOOL FINANCE LITIGATION 
Education reform litigation has typically focused on challenges to school 
finance systems.14 It is commonly seen as taking place in three “waves” of 
reform that differed based on the arguments raised by plaintiffs.15 The first two 
sections of Part I introduce the first two waves of litigation, in turn, during 
which plaintiffs’ claims were typically defeated. The third section looks more 
closely at the current third wave of litigation, in which plaintiffs have enjoyed 
more success in convincing courts to overturn statewide education finance 
 
 14 This term refers to how state legislatures choose to allocate money to fund public schools throughout a 
state. Typically, finance systems fund local schools through a combination of local property taxes, statewide 
funds, and federal money. See Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I), 487 P.2d 1241, 1245–46 (Cal. 1971) (in bank). 
Throughout this Comment, school finance systems and school finance schemes are referred to interchangeably. 
 15 Scott R. Bauries, Is There an Elephant in the Room?: Judicial Review of Educational Adequacy and 
the Separation of Powers in State Constitutions, 61 ALA. L. REV. 701, 704 (2010). 
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schemes. The final section concludes by discussing justiciability concerns—the 
primary legal barrier to school finance litigants throughout the three waves. 
A. The First Wave: Equal Protection Claims Under the U.S. Constitution 
The first wave of school finance litigation began in 1971,16 when the 
California Supreme Court held that the state’s school finance system, which 
resulted in significant disparities in funding between school districts,17 violated 
the equal protection guarantees of the United States and California 
constitutions.18 During this first wave of litigation, plaintiffs primarily argued 
that school finance systems that permitted unequal funding between school 
districts violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.19 The 
first wave came to an abrupt end in 1973, however, when the Supreme Court 
decided San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,20 an equal 
protection challenge to Texas’s school finance scheme that created inequalities 
in school district funding. 
In Rodriguez, the Supreme Court’s rejection of two arguments proved fatal 
to education reformers’ federal finance suits. First, the Court rejected the claim 
that education was a fundamental right under the U.S. Constitution.21 Second, 
the Court refused to recognize wealth as a suspect classification.22 
Accordingly, the equal protection challenge to Texas’s finance scheme did not 
trigger strict scrutiny from the Court. Instead, the Court applied the more 
deferential standard of rational-basis scrutiny and upheld Texas’s finance 
system as rationally related to the legitimate state interest in local control.23 
Thus, Rodriguez forced reformers relying on the Federal Constitution to 
eliminate educational inequality to pursue a new path for redress.24 This new 
path lay in the Court’s concluding comment in Rodriguez that “[t]he 
 
 16 William E. Thro, Judicial Analysis During the Third Wave of School Finance Litigation: The 
Massachusetts Decision as a Model, 35 B.C. L. REV. 597, 601 n.22 (1994). 
 17 Serrano I, 487 P.2d at 1247–48. 
 18 Id. at 1241. 
 19 See, e.g., Quentin A. Palfrey, The State Judiciary’s Role in Fulfilling Brown’s Promise, 8 MICH. J. 
RACE & L. 1, 13 (2002). 
 20 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
 21 Id. at 37. 
 22 Id. at 28. 
 23 Id. at 49, 55. 
 24 But see Justin J. Sayfie, Comment, Education Emancipation for Inner City Students: A New Legal 
Paradigm for Achieving Equality of Educational Opportunity, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 913, 922–23 (1994) 
(arguing that plaintiffs may have been successful if they claimed to be receiving “an education falling below a 
hypothesized constitutional floor” rather than a “relative disadvantage”).  
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consideration and initiation of fundamental reforms with respect to state 
taxation and education are matters reserved for . . . the various States.”25 
B. The Second Wave: Equal Protection Claims Under State Constitutions 
After the Supreme Court noted that education finance was a matter best 
reserved to the states,26 school finance litigation shifted to state-specific 
attacks.27 This new strategy emerged soon after the Rodriguez decision.28 
Specifically, litigants focused on challenging school finance schemes based on 
state, rather than federal, equal protection rights.29 This new approach seemed 
promising because it directly addressed a shortcoming of the plaintiffs’ case in 
Rodriguez—the lack of a textual right to education in the U.S. Constitution.30 
While the U.S. Constitution does not provide for a right to education,31 all 
state constitutions contain explicit provisions regarding education.32 For that 
reason, litigants reasoned they might be able to argue more successfully that 
education was a fundamental right under state constitutions.33 If that were the 
case, school finance schemes would warrant strict scrutiny under state equal 
protection jurisprudence.34 This approach was bolstered by the fact that state 
courts were not required to follow federal constitutional jurisprudence in 
interpreting their own state constitutional provisions.35 
 
 25 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 58 (emphasis added). 
 26 Id. 
 27 William F. Dietz, Note, Manageable Adequacy Standards in Education Reform Litigation, 74 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 1193, 1198 (1996). 
 28 Joseph S. Patt, Note, School Finance Battles: Survey Says? It’s All Just a Change in Attitudes, 34 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 547, 559 (1999). The second wave began with the New Jersey Supreme Court’s 
decision in Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973). Kevin Randall McMillan, Note, The Turning Tide: 
The Emerging Fourth Wave of School Finance Reform Litigation and the Courts’ Lingering Institutional 
Concerns, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1867, 1872 (1998). 
 29 Derrick Darby & Richard E. Levy, Slaying the Inequality Villain in School Finance: Is the Right to 
Education the Silver Bullet?, 20 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 351, 360 (2011). 
 30 See Patt, supra note 28, at 559. 
 31 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35 (“Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection 
under our Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected. As we have 
said, the undisputed importance of education will not alone cause this Court to depart from the usual standard 
for reviewing a State’s social and economic legislation.”). 
 32 Molly McUsic, The Use of Education Clauses in School Finance Reform Litigation, 28 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 307, 311 (1991) (“Every state constitution contains an education clause that generally requires the state 
legislature to establish some system of free public schools.” (footnote omitted)). 
 33 Patt, supra note 28, at 559. 
 34 Id. 
 35 See Dietz, supra note 27, at 1198. 
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Litigation during the second wave of reform enjoyed limited success.36 
About half of school finance plaintiffs were successful in having their state’s 
finance system overturned.37 When plaintiffs were successful, state courts 
typically applied strict scrutiny after holding that education was a fundamental 
right or that wealth was a suspect classification.38 However, many state courts 
refused to strike down school finance schemes by simply adopting the 
Supreme Court’s Rodriguez analysis.39 
These latter courts were still reluctant to grant plaintiffs victories for 
several reasons. Many courts resisted equality arguments because of concern 
that a constitutional requirement of equal educational funding could lead to 
calls for equalizing state funding in all areas of government spending.40 Courts 
were also hesitant to find for plaintiffs because of two justiciability concerns: 
(1) the perception that judges did not have the expertise to get involved in 
complicated problems of education finance, and (2) the lack of manageable 
standards for determining what qualified as a “fair and equitable” finance 
system.41 Given the mixed success of school finance plaintiffs during the 
second wave, litigants eventually turned to a new approach that would usher in 
the third wave of education finance litigation. 
 
 36 McUsic, supra note 32, at 314. 
 37 Aaron Y. Tang, Broken Systems, Broken Duties: A New Theory for School Finance Litigation, 94 
MARQ. L. REV. 1195, 1202 (2011). 
 38 See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II), 557 P.2d 929, 951–52 (Cal. 1976) (in bank) (finding wealth to 
be a suspect classification); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 374 (Conn. 1977) (finding a fundamental right to 
education); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 878 (W. Va. 1979) (finding a fundamental right to education); 
Washakie Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 334 (Wyo. 1980) (“A classification on the 
basis of wealth is considered suspect, especially when applied to fundamental interests.”). But see Dupree v. 
Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Ark. 1983) (striking down school finance system under rational-
basis scrutiny). 
 39 Allen W. Hubsch, The Emerging Right to Education Under State Constitutional Law, 65 TEMP. L. 
REV. 1325, 1325–26, 1330 (1992). 
 40 Avidan Y. Cover, Note, Is “Adequacy” a More “Political Question” than “Equality?”: The Effect of 
Standards-Based Education on Judicial Standards for Education Finance, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
403, 410 (2002). 
 41 William S. Koski, Of Fuzzy Standards and Institutional Constraints: A Re-Examination of the 
Jurisprudential History of Educational Finance Reform Litigation, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1185, 1189 
(2003). 
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C. The Third Wave: Adequacy Claims Under the Education Articles of State 
Constitutions 
The third wave of school finance litigation began in 1989 as plaintiffs 
shifted their equality arguments to adequacy arguments,42 claiming that school 
finance schemes failed to provide a minimally adequate education as required 
by state constitutions.43 During this period of litigation, which continues today, 
courts have interpreted the education clauses in state constitutions to require 
states to provide a substantive education that does not fall below a minimally 
adequate level.44 
All state constitutions, except for the Mississippi Constitution, contain an 
education clause that directs the legislature to provide for some level of 
education.45 The clauses are not uniform among the states, however, and they 
impose differing duties upon the legislature based on the constitutional text.46 
Despite the lack of uniformity, many clauses are similar enough to allow 
classification into three general categories of ascending legislative duties.47 
The first category—“establishment provisions”—encompasses seventeen 
constitutions that impose a duty upon the legislature to create and maintain a 
system of free public education.48 These education clauses, on their face, do 
not require the state to provide any particular qualitative level of education.49 
The second category includes eighteen state constitutions that provide general 
 
 42 The adequacy claims that characterize the third wave of reform continue as the primary approach to 
challenging school finance systems today. Bauries, supra note 15, at 705. 
 43 Koski, supra note 41, at 1192. 
 44 Id. at 1191. Plaintiffs often failed when relying upon an education clause to make an equity claim. 
Hubsch, supra note 39, at 1336. For example, the Colorado Supreme Court rejected the argument that the 
Colorado constitutional requirement of “thorough and uniform” public schools required equal school 
expenditures. Lujan v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1024 (Colo. 1982) (en banc). 
 45 William E. Thro, A New Approach to State Constitutional Analysis in School Finance Litigation, 14 
J.L. & POL. 525, 538 (1998).  
 46 Id. at 538–39.  
 47 See, e.g., id. at 539–40.  
 48 Id. at 539. Connecticut’s constitutional requirement serves as a typical example: “There shall always 
be free public elementary and secondary schools in the state. The general assembly shall implement this 
principle by appropriate legislation.” CONN. CONST. art. VIII, § 1. 
 49 See, e.g., Thro, supra note 45, at 539 n.36. For example, the Alaska Constitution provides:  
The legislature shall by general law establish and maintain a system of public schools open to all 
children of the State, and may provide for other public educational institutions. Schools and 
institutions so established shall be free from sectarian control. No money shall be paid from 
public funds for the direct benefit of any religious or other private educational institution. 
ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1. 
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“quality provisions” regarding education.50 These provisions typically require 
the legislature to create a system of public education that is “thorough,” 
“efficient,” or “thorough and efficient.”51 The third category includes the 
fourteen constitutions that make education a “high duty” for the state.52 The 
text of these constitutional provisions indicates that the legislature’s duty to 
provide for education trumps legislative duties in other areas.53 
These education clauses form the bedrock of the adequacy arguments—
claiming that the legislature must provide for a substantively adequate 
education system—that characterize the third wave. Adequacy arguments 
enjoy several advantages over the equality arguments of the first two reform 
periods.54 First, education clauses in state constitutions provide courts with a 
clear textual source for finding a state duty to provide education to residents.55 
Adequacy suits are thus able to sidestep the textual hurdle that confronted 
earlier litigants, particularly during the first wave of litigation.56 Second, 
adequacy claims appeal to traditional notions of fairness.57 Few would disagree 
that all children should receive a minimally basic education. Demands for 
equal education are more controversial.58 In accordance with this notion, 
adequacy suits do not discourage local school districts from providing a 
greater-than-adequate education for their students by threatening to redistribute 
any extra resources to a poorer district.59 Lastly, adequacy arguments are 
limited to education, whereas equality arguments raise the danger that granting 
 
 50 Thro, supra note 45, at 539.  
 51 Id. at 539 n.38. The Illinois Constitution provides an example of this type of education clause. The 
constitution requires: “The State shall provide for an efficient system of high quality public educational 
institutions and services. Education in public schools through the secondary level shall be free. There may be 
such other free education as the General Assembly provides by law.” ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1. 
 52 Thro, supra note 45, at 539–40.  
 53 Id. Georgia’s constitutional requirement that “[t]he provision of an adequate public education for the 
citizens shall be a primary obligation of the State of Georgia. . . . [which] shall be free and shall be provided 
for by taxation” falls within this category. GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1. 
 54 Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance Reform, 48 VAND. L. REV. 
101, 166–70 (1995). 
 55 Id. at 166–67. 
 56 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (“Education, of course, is not 
among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution.”). 
 57 Enrich, supra note 54, at 167. 
 58 Id.  
 59 Id. This fear was evident in the wake of the California Supreme Court’s decision in Serrano v. Priest, 
which required the state to equalize funding between school districts. In the wake of Serrano, Californians 
passed Proposition 13, which dramatically limited annual real estate taxes that funded schools. Christine M. 
O’Neill, Comment, Closing the Door on Positive Rights: State Court Use of the Political Question Doctrine to 
Deny Access to Educational Adequacy Claims, 42 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 545, 552 (2009). 
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plaintiffs relief may spur equality demands in a variety of other sectors in 
which the government provides services.60 Perhaps because of these 
advantages, plaintiffs have enjoyed more success during the third wave of 
litigation.61 Courts in Kentucky, Montana, Texas, Arizona, Massachusetts, 
New Jersey, and Tennessee, among others, have found that their states’ school 
finance systems violated the education clauses of their respective state 
constitutions.62 
Despite the advantages of adequacy arguments, state courts still confront 
challenges when relying upon an education clause to hold that the state must 
provide a constitutionally adequate education.63 The primary challenge is 
interpretive64—figuring out what exactly constitutes an adequate education 
based on the relatively sparse constitutional text.65 In addition, courts still have 
concerns about the justiciability of adequacy claims.66 As a result, inconsistent 
results still characterize the jurisprudence of the third wave.67 While some state 
courts have been more willing to “make forays into educational policy-
making,”68 others have remained hesitant to enter the brier patch based on 
justiciability concerns.69 
Commentators have struggled to explain this divergence between activism 
and restraint.70 One might expect more activism in a state whose education 
clause makes education a “high duty” for the legislature, and more judicial 
 
 60 Enrich, supra note 54, at 168. 
 61 Dietz, supra note 27, at 1200, 1201 n.65. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Enrich, supra note 54, at 170, 179. 
 64 Id. at 170. 
 65 For example, the Kentucky Constitution provides that “[t]he General Assembly shall, by appropriate 
legislation, provide for an efficient system of common schools throughout the State.” KY. CONST. § 183. 
 66 See, e.g., Neb. Coal. for Educ. Equity & Adequacy v. Heineman, 731 N.W.2d 164, 183 (Neb. 2007); 
Okla. Educ. Ass’n v. State, 2007 OK 30, ¶ 26, 158 P.3d 1058, 1066. 
 67 For example, the Kentucky Supreme Court struck down the state’s entire school system, not just its 
funding scheme, even though Kentucky’s constitution only contains a “quality provision” in its education 
clause. See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989). In contrast, the Illinois 
Supreme Court held that school finance challenges were nonjusticiable even though the Illinois Constitution 
has an education clause that makes education a “high duty” of the state. See Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 
672 N.E.2d 1178 (Ill. 1996).  
 68 Koski, supra note 41, at 1192. 
 69 See, e.g., Edgar, 672 N.E.2d at 1189; City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 59 (R.I. 1995) 
(“[T]he absence of justiciable standards could engage the court in a morass comparable to the decades-long 
struggle of the Supreme Court of New Jersey that has attempted to define what constitutes the ‘thorough and 
efficient’ education specified in that state’s constitution.”). 
 70 See, e.g., Karen Swenson, School Finance Reform Litigation: Why Are Some State Supreme Courts 
Activist and Others Restrained?, 63 ALB. L. REV. 1147 (2000). 
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restraint in a state that only has a weak “establishment provision” in its 
education clause. However, commentators have observed that there is 
surprisingly no relationship between the strength of a state constitution’s 
education clause and a court’s finding that a school finance system is 
unconstitutional.71 Other commentators have argued that “courts often have 
ignored the meaning of the text” in interpreting their state’s education article.72 
Some observers suggest that additional explanations, such as judicial 
frustration with the relative unwillingness of legislatures to reform a school 
finance scheme, do not account for the inconsistent results.73 However, courts 
have been less likely to strike down a school finance scheme in states with 
higher per pupil expenditures.74 
Despite the judicial activism that characterized the start of the third wave of 
litigation,75 inconsistency remains. Evidence even suggests that courts are 
increasingly granting victories to states over plaintiffs because of lingering 
justiciability concerns.76 
D. Legal Barriers to Plaintiffs: Justiciability Concerns 
Justiciability concerns have loomed in the background of education finance 
litigation throughout the three waves.77 Judicial reluctance to overturn school 
finance systems stems from two justiciability considerations. First, courts are 
concerned with their institutional role in deciding school finance cases, as 
evinced by judicial discussion of the separation of powers doctrine in these 
 
 71 E.g., id. at 1175. 
 72 Thro, supra note 45, at 540. Thro notes that activist courts in nine states determined that their 
constitutions guaranteed some form of quality education or considered education a fundamental right despite 
the fact that their education clauses merely required the legislature to establish a system of education. Id. at 
540–41. In contrast, courts in Georgia and Illinois ignored the stronger textual mandates in their respective 
education clauses in holding that education was not a fundamental right. Id. at 542. 
 73 Swenson, supra note 70, at 1176–77. Some commentators have relied upon “representative-
reinforcement” theory to argue that courts that are fed up with legislative inaction may be more likely to 
declare a school finance scheme unconstitutional. Id. at 1179.  
 74 Id. at 1176. 
 75 See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); Edgewood Indep. Sch. 
Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989). 
 76 Julia A. Simon-Kerr & Robynn K. Sturm, Justiciability and the Role of Courts in Adequacy Litigation: 
Preserving the Constitutional Right to Education, 6 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 83, 95–96 (2010). 
 77 See, e.g., McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327, 329 (N.D. Ill. 1968) (first wave), aff’d per curiam sub 
nom. McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969); Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1191 (Ill. 
1996) (third wave); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 897–98 (W. Va. 1979) (Neely, J., dissenting) (second 
wave).  
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cases.78 Second, courts are concerned with their institutional capacity to decide 
education finance challenges.79 This unease is apparent from judicial 
discussion of the political question doctrine in these cases.80 Courts have often 
relied on these two doctrines to justify their decisions to avoid deciding school 
finance cases on the merits.81 
With respect to separation of powers, courts have observed that 
constitutional language explicitly delegates to the legislature the task of 
designing school finance systems.82 Because “each branch of government has 
certain delineated powers that the other branches of government may not 
intrude upon,” some courts have refused to interfere with legislative decisions 
concerning school finance.83 The direct relationship between school finance 
and control over appropriations, a power granted exclusively to the 
legislature,84 bolsters this hesitance. Accordingly, judicial concern about 
usurping legislative power has led courts to hold that school finance suits are 
nonjusticiable claims because they would force the judiciary to take on 
legislative duties.85 
State courts have also used the federal political question doctrine to justify 
dismissing finance suits without deciding them on the merits.86 The doctrine 
suggests that courts should withhold judgment in areas where they lack the 
institutional capacity to fully understand the issues involved in a case.87 Justice 
Brennan laid out the modern political question doctrine in Baker v. Carr88 
 
 78 See, e.g., Coal. for Adequacy & Fairness in Sch. Funding, Inc. v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400, 407–08 (Fla. 
1996) (per curiam); City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 57–58 (R.I. 1995). 
 79 See, e.g., Chiles, 680 So. 2d at 408; Neb. Coal. for Educ. Equity & Adequacy v. Heineman, 731 
N.W.2d 164, 178–83 (Neb. 2007). 
 80 See, e.g., Chiles, 680 So. 2d at 408; Heineman, 731 N.W.2d at 178–83. 
 81 See, e.g., Chiles, 680 So. 2d at 407–08; Heineman, 731 N.W.2d at 183; Sundlun, 662 A.2d at 57–58. 
 82 E.g., Sundlun, 662 A.2d at 57–58. 
 83 Chiles, 680 So. 2d at 407. 
 84 Heineman, 731 N.W.2d at 181–82; Okla. Educ. Ass’n v. State, 2007 OK 30, ¶ 23, 158 P.3d 1058, 
1066. 
 85 See, e.g., Heineman, 731 N.W.2d at 181. 
 86 See, e.g., Chiles, 680 So. 2d at 407; Okla. Educ. Ass’n, 2007 OK 30, at ¶¶ 18–25. 
 87 E.g., Michael Paisner, Conceptions of the Vessel: Abu Ali, Habeas Corpus, and the Dark Side of the 
“War on Terrorism,” 26 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 309, 327 (2007). The doctrine is also designed to ensure 
that courts do not intervene in areas where the constitution has placed exclusive decision-making power in 
another branch of government. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. 
L. REV. 1, 7–8 (1959). 
 88 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
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when he articulated six characteristics that might indicate that an issue is a 
nonjusticiable political question.89 
Of these characteristics, several are particularly relevant for school finance 
cases. For example, devising school finance systems requires a balancing of 
competing values, a task that legislatures are often best equipped to handle.90 
As a result, these suits may be impossible to resolve “without an initial policy 
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion,” which is Justice 
Brennan’s third characteristic of a political question.91 
A nonjusticiable political question may also be present when a court lacks 
“judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving [the issue].”92 
School finance cases implicate this characteristic because the sparse language 
of education clauses provides little guidance for a court to decide what 
qualifies as an equal or adequate education.93 This ambiguity has led to 
concern that deciding a finance suit on the merits will only result in years of 
 
 89 Id. at 217. These characteristics include the following: (1) “a textually demonstrable constitutional 
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department,” (2) “a lack of judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards for resolving [the issue],” (3) “the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy 
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion,” (4) “the impossibility of a court’s undertaking 
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government,” (5) “an 
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made,” and (6) “the potentiality of 
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.” Id. 
 90 See John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1939, 
1974 (2011) (“[T]he very essence of legislative choice lies not merely in the identification of an appropriate 
policy goal, but in the determination of what competing values will or will not be sacrificed to the achievement 
of a particular objective.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 91 Baker, 369 U.S. at 217; see also Marrero v. Commonwealth, 709 A.2d 956, 966 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
1998) (“[I]t would be impossible to resolve the claims without making an initial policy determination of a kind 
which is clearly of legislative, and not judicial, discretion.”), aff’d, 739 A.2d 110 (Pa. 1999). 
 92 Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.  
 93 See, e.g., Coal. for Adequacy & Fairness in Sch. Funding, Inc. v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400, 407 (Fla. 
1996) (per curiam) (agreeing with appellees’ claim that the court lacked judicially manageable standards to 
determine adequacy); Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1191 (Ill. 1996) (“What constitutes 
a ‘high quality’ education, and how it may best be provided, cannot be ascertained by any judicially 
discoverable or manageable standards. The constitution provides no principled basis for a judicial definition of 
high quality.”); Neb. Coal. for Educ. Equity & Adequacy v. Heineman, 731 N.W.2d 164, 183 (Neb. 2007) 
(“The Nebraska Constitution commits the issue of providing free instruction to the Legislature and fails to 
provide judicially discernible and manageable standards for determining what level of public education the 
Legislature must provide.”). But see Alfred A. Lindseth, The Legal Backdrop to Adequacy, in COURTING 
FAILURE: HOW SCHOOL FINANCE LAWSUITS EXPLOIT JUDGES’ GOOD INTENTIONS AND HARM OUR CHILDREN 
33, 46–47 (Eric A. Hanushek ed., 2006) (noting that plaintiffs and courts have relied on standardized tests to 
measure adequacy); Dietz, supra note 27, at 1212–13 (arguing that courts should use the legislature’s 
“statutory expressions of aspirational goals” or “school accreditation standards” as adequacy standards). 
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protracted litigation.94 Justiciability concerns are a real impediment to 
education reform litigants and have even led some courts to overturn recent 
precedent holding that issues of educational adequacy were justiciable.95 
II. THE FAILURE OF FINANCE LITIGATION TO ELIMINATE EDUCATIONAL 
INEQUALITY AND INADEQUACY 
Despite forty years of school finance litigation, reformers have failed to 
realize the promise of equal educational opportunity articulated in Brown v. 
Board of Education.96 Instead, as Part II discusses below, evidence indicates a 
substantial and persistent achievement gap between children growing up in 
poverty and children growing up in wealthier communities. This inequality 
also divides along racial lines. This Part first discusses the lingering inequality 
and inadequacy in public education, indicating that school finance litigation 
has been an insufficient approach to achieve the goals of Brown. Section B 
explains this insufficiency by discussing literature that directly questions the 
strength of the link between funding and student achievement. Overall, Part II 
demonstrates that education reform litigants should redirect their challenges 
away from school finance and toward policies that have a clearer connection to 
student achievement. 
A. Persistent Educational Inequality and Inadequacy in the United States 
Education inequality remains a fact of life throughout the United States. 
The academic performance of an average black or Hispanic student is 
equivalent to the performance of an average white student in the lowest 
quartile of white achievement.97 For example, black and Hispanic students in 
the twelfth grade perform mathematics at the level of a white student in the 
eighth grade.98 One education policy organization concretely stated the 
implications of this achievement gap: “17-year-old African American and 
 
 94 See City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 59 (R.I. 1995) (“[T]he absence of justiciable standards 
could engage the court in a morass comparable to the decades-long struggle of the Supreme Court of New 
Jersey that has attempted to define what constitutes the ‘thorough and efficient’ education specified in that 
state’s constitution.”). 
 95 Ex parte James (James II), 836 So. 2d 813, 815–16 (Ala. 2002) (per curiam). 
 96 See 347 U.S. 483, 493–96 (1954). 
 97 John E. Chubb & Tom Loveless, Bridging the Achievement Gap, in BRIDGING THE ACHIEVEMENT GAP 
1, 1 (John E. Chubb & Tom Loveless eds., 2002). 
 98 Flores, supra note 11, at 30.  
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Latino students have skills in English, math, and science similar to those of 13-
year-old Whites.”99 
Evidence suggests that the achievement gap not only begins before students 
enter school, but also widens while students are in school.100 This 
compounding inequality may be explained by the lower academic expectations 
that teachers often have for minority students.101 Some studies have found that 
teachers tend to provide less classroom support to minority students than to 
white students.102 The end result is that minorities continue to lag behind their 
white counterparts in terms of high school graduation rates, which have 
declined since the 1960s.103 
This persistent inequality is particularly troubling because of the inadequate 
education received by poor, minority students.104 Uncertified teachers, who are 
often the least effective, are concentrated in schools attended by these 
students.105 The implications of this instructional inadequacy are grave; 
curricular changes and improvements have a minimal impact on student 
achievement when teachers do not know how to properly implement the new 
curriculum.106 Impoverished minority students also suffer because of their 
inadequate access to rigorous, college-preparatory classes.107 Many of these 
students are simply tracked into less challenging classes.108 
Educational inadequacy also harms students entering school with limited 
English-speaking ability. Schools often fail to provide instructors qualified to 
teach students who are still learning English, leaving these students to fend for 
themselves in the classroom.109 As a result, graduation and achievement rates 
 
 99 Press Release, Educ. Trust, supra note 7. 
 100 Murnane et al., supra note 4, at 98–99; Phillips et al., supra note 4, at 229–33. 
 101 Flores, supra note 11, at 33–35. 
 102 Ronald F. Ferguson, Teachers’ Perceptions and Expectations and the Black–White Test Score Gap, in 
THE BLACK–WHITE TEST SCORE GAP, supra note 4, at 273, 294, 313. 
 103 James J. Heckman & Paul A. LaFontaine, The American High School Graduation Rate: Trends and 
Levels, 92 REV. ECON. & STAT. 244, 253 (2010).  
 104 Press Release, Educ. Trust, supra note 7. The gap would certainly be less troubling if it were the 
difference between an excellent and adequate education. 
 105 See Linda Darling-Hammond, Access to Quality Teaching: An Analysis of Inequality in California’s 
Public Schools, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1045, 1101–03 (2003).  
 106 Id. at 1079. 
 107 Saul Geiser & Veronica Santelices, The Role of Advanced Placement and Honors Courses in College 
Admissions 4, 21 (2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://cshe.berkeley.edu/publications/docs/ 
ROP.Geiser.4.04.pdf. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Darling-Hammond, supra note 105, at 1113–17. 
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for students learning English are especially low.110 The achievement gap 
represents the pervasive inequality and inadequacy in American education, 
which is all the more troubling given that the United States already lags behind 
many of its international peers in terms of student achievement.111 
Education finance suits do not seem to have changed this inequality and 
inadequacy. The achievement gap between white and minority students does 
not differ significantly between states where school finance suits have 
succeeded and states where plaintiffs have lost. For example, the black–white 
mathematics achievement gap112 in California and Connecticut, two states 
where education finance plaintiffs have won,113 is similar to the achievement 
gap in New York and Maryland, where education finance plaintiffs have not 
found success.114 A similar pattern appears when looking at the black–white 
reading achievement gap.115 States where education finance plaintiffs have 
enjoyed success, such as Washington and New Jersey,116 have reading 
achievement gaps similar to the gaps in states such as Georgia and Ohio, where 
school finance suits proved unsuccessful.117 The Hispanic–white achievement 
gaps in reading and math are also no narrower in states where education 
finance plaintiffs have won suits.118 Thus, education reform litigants, by 
 
 110 See, e.g., ALBERT CORTEZ & ABELARDO VILLARREAL, INTERCULTURAL DEV. RESEARCH ASS’N, 
EDUCATION OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE LEARNERS IN U.S. AND TEXAS SCHOOLS: WHERE WE ARE, WHAT WE 
HAVE LEARNED AND WHERE WE NEED TO GO FROM HERE—A 2009 UPDATE 10 (2009) (indicating that 
secondary English learners perform much worse than their peers); Victoria-Maria MacDonald, The Status of 
English Language Learners in Florida: Trends and Prospects 5.11–.12 (Apr. 2004) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://nepc.colorado.edu/files/EPSL-0401-113-EPRU.pdf (highlighting the lower graduation rates 
of English language learners). 
 111 See OECD, PISA 2009 RESULTS: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 8 fig.1 (2009). 
 112 See ALAN VANNEMAN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., NCES 2009-455, ACHIEVEMENT GAPS: HOW 
BLACK AND WHITE STUDENTS IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS PERFORM IN MATHEMATICS AND READING ON THE 
NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF EDUCATIONAL PROGRESS 21 fig.11 (2009) [hereinafter BLACK–WHITE 
ACHIEVEMENT GAP]. 
 113 See, e.g., Serrano I, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971) (in bank); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 
1977). 
 114 See, e.g., Hornbeck v. Somerset Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758 (Md. 1983); Bd. of Educ. v. 
Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y. 1982). 
 115 See BLACK–WHITE ACHIEVEMENT GAP, supra note 112, at 43 fig.23. 
 116 See, e.g., Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71 
(Wash. 1978) (en banc).  
 117 See, e.g., McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156 (Ga. 1981); Bd. of Educ. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813 
(Ohio 1979). 
 118 See F. CADELLE HEMPHILL ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., NCES 2011-459, ACHIEVEMENT GAPS: HOW 
HISPANIC AND WHITE STUDENTS IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS PERFORM IN MATHEMATICS AND READING ON THE 
NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF EDUCATIONAL PROGRESS 27 fig.15, 53 fig.27 (2011) [hereinafter HISPANIC–WHITE 
ACHIEVEMENT GAP]. 
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overturning state school finance schemes, do not seem to have made much 
headway in advancing educational equity or adequacy. 
B. The Tenuous Link Between Money and Academic Achievement 
The ambiguous relationship between money and academic achievement, 
recognized since some of the earliest school finance cases,119 may at least 
partially explain the failure of education finance suits to close the achievement 
gap. Notable scholars have observed that general expenditures on education are 
not significantly related to academic achievement.120 Similarly, economists 
have found that increases in per-pupil expenditures have not led to better 
academic achievement over the course of three decades.121 
California provides a good example of the disjuncture between spending 
and achievement. Evidence indicates that equalizing finances between districts 
in California did not equalize educational outcomes among students across 
districts in the wake of the Serrano school finance decisions.122 Numerous 
examples exist of school districts that spend liberally while achieving subpar 
results.123 This phenomenon is also evident at the national level; while 
expenditures have consistently trended upward, achievement in reading and 
mathematics has remained stagnant for decades.124 The disconnect between 
expenditures and achievement may occur because allocating more money to 
education does not necessarily ensure that the money makes it into the 
 
 119 E.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 43 (1973). 
 120 Julian R. Betts, Is There a Link Between School Inputs and Earnings? Fresh Scrutiny of an Old 
Literature, in DOES MONEY MATTER? THE EFFECT OF SCHOOL RESOURCES ON STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT AND 
ADULT SUCCESS 141, 141 (Gary Burtless ed., 1996); T. Stephen Childs & Charol Shakeshaft, A Meta-Analysis 
of Research on the Relationship Between Educational Expenditures and Student Achievement, 12 J. EDUC. FIN. 
249, 263 (1986); Linda Darling-Hammond, Teacher Quality and Student Achievement: A Review of State 
Policy Evidence, EDUC. POL’Y ANALYSIS ARCHIVES 1, 23 (Jan. 1, 2000), http://epaa.asu.edu/ojs/article/view/ 
392/515. But see Harold Wenglinsky, How Money Matters: The Effect of School District Spending on 
Academic Achievement, 70 SOC. EDUC. 221, 232–33 (1997) (arguing that increased expenditures improve 
academic achievement because they enable school districts to reduce class sizes). 
 121 See Eric A. Hanushek, The Failure of Input-Based Schooling Policies, 113 ECON. J. F64, F67–69 
(2003); see also Eric A. Hanushek, Throwing Money at Schools, 1 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 19, 30 (1981). 
 122 William A. Fischel, How Serrano Caused Proposition 13, 12 J.L. & POL. 607, 614 (1996). 
 123 See Williamson M. Evers & Paul Clopton, High-Spending, Low-Performing School Districts, in 
COURTING FAILURE, supra note 93, at 103 (citing examples). 
 124 Herbert J. Walberg, Achievement in American Schools, in A PRIMER ON AMERICA’S SCHOOLS 43, 44–
48 (Terry M. Moe ed., 2001). 
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classroom.125 Accordingly, a critical premise underlying the arguments of 
education finance plaintiffs has proven to be tenuous at best. 
Recent court decisions demonstrate growing skepticism that additional 
funding effectively advances educational adequacy and equality.126 Instead, 
courts have noted that considerations such as financial mismanagement, 
inferior school leadership, and environmental factors may be just as 
responsible for low academic outcomes.127 Skeptics include state courts that 
previously have granted victories to school finance plaintiffs.128 
These concerns are legitimate. Evidence indicates that management 
decisions within school districts are responsible for an unequal distribution of 
resources among schools within a given district.129 This often deprives 
disadvantaged students of critical assistance.130 The increasing judicial distrust 
of education finance suits has led some scholars to suggest that education 
reform litigants should reframe their suits so they do not appear simply to be 
seeking greater funding.131 Given the weak record of education finance 
litigation, this strategy shift is advisable. 
Education reform litigants do not face an insurmountable task. State courts 
have shown a willingness to find a state constitutional guarantee to an equal or 
minimally adequate education.132 Nevertheless, school finance suits have been 
unable to overcome two obstacles previously discussed. First, the legislative 
aspect of funding education statewide and the vagueness of specific state 
constitutional language have led many courts to hold that finance suits are 
nonjusticiable.133 Second, even when courts have found finance claims 
justiciable and awarded plaintiffs relief, the litigation victories have not 
 
 125 The bureaucracies of many large school districts often consume a large portion of education 
expenditures. Cf. BENJAMIN SCAFIDI, FRIEDMAN FOUND. FOR EDUC. CHOICE, THE SCHOOL STAFFING SURGE 
PART II: DECADES OF EMPLOYMENT GROWTH IN AMERICA’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS 1 (2013) (highlighting the 
growth of education bureaucracies in the United States and noting that between fiscal years 1950 and 2009 
“administrators and other non-teaching staff experienced growth of 702 percent, [which is] more than seven 
times the [percentage] increase in students”). 
 126 Simon-Kerr & Sturm, supra note 76, at 110–13 (discussing cases). 
 127 Id. at 110. 
 128 Compare Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1989), with Neeley v. W. 
Orange–Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746, 788–90 (Tex. 2005). 
 129 See Marguerite Roza & Paul T. Hill, How Can Anyone Say What’s Adequate if Nobody Knows How 
Money Is Spent Now?, in COURTING FAILURE, supra note 93, at 235. 
 130 See id. 
 131 Simon-Kerr & Sturm, supra note 76, at 121–23. 
 132 Supra Part I. 
 133 Supra Part I.D. 
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generally led to greater educational equality or adequacy.134 Thus, there is a 
pressing need for a new strategy that moves beyond finance litigation. Part III 
takes the next step by proposing a new path for education reform litigants to 
take that addresses the two main weaknesses of finance litigation. 
III.  SHIFTING THE FOCUS OF EDUCATION REFORM LITIGATION TO SKILL-
BASED EDUCATION INPUTS 
Given the historical ineffectiveness of school finance litigation in closing 
the achievement gap, education reform litigants should begin focusing their 
efforts on challenging local school district policies that lead to an unequal or 
inadequate distribution of skill-based education inputs. For purposes of this 
Comment, skill-based inputs are defined as professionally trained individuals 
who play a role in the running of schools. Classroom teachers and school 
administrators are two salient examples of skill-based inputs. 
School districts follow many policies that lead to inadequate or inequitable 
access to skill-based inputs. An example of such a policy would be a district’s 
use of combination classes, in which students from two separate grade levels 
are grouped into a classroom under the tutelage of a single teacher.135 Under 
this policy, students in a combination class may only receive half the 
instructional time that students in a uniform class receive, since the teacher 
must teach two separate curriculums in the same amount of time.136 Another 
example, recognized by a South Carolina court, would be the lack of access to 
preschool programs—an intervention that many experts argue is effective in 
helping poor students enter school on an equal level with their wealthier 
peers.137 Education reform litigants should focus on challenging these types of 
policies because of the significant impact of skill-based inputs, and teachers in 
particular, in generating academic achievement.138 
 
 134 Supra Part II.A. 
 135 See generally DeWayne A. Mason & Robert B. Burns, Reassessing the Effects of Combination 
Classes, 3 EDUC. RES. & EVALUATION 1 (1997). 
 136 Some scholars have found that the use of combination classes has a negative effect on student 
achievement. See id. 
 137 See Abbeville Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. State, No. 93-CP-31-0169, slip op. at 160–61 (S.C. Ct. Com. Pl. Dec. 
29, 2005) (“There is testimony from experts and educators alike that effective early childhood intervention, 
especially to children who are born into poverty, can make a difference in educational abilities and 
achievements.”). 
 138 See infra Part III.A. 
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Part III proceeds in three sections in suggesting this new focus for 
education reform litigants. Section A demonstrates the substantial impact that 
teacher quality, as an example of a skill-based input, has on student 
achievement. Section A’s discussion of the impact of good teachers illustrates 
why this new litigation strategy may improve academic achievement more 
successfully than school finance litigation. 
Section B focuses more specifically on a widely used layoff procedure that 
education reform litigants should challenge. This procedure, often referred to 
as “last in, first out” (LIFO), removes teachers based on lack of seniority, 
rather than lack of effectiveness, thus diminishing the number of quality 
instructors available to students. The policy also disproportionately harms 
students at schools staffed by significant numbers of teachers with little 
seniority because it exacerbates turnover problems at these schools. As a result, 
LIFO is a prime example of a policy that education reformers should challenge 
in court as violative of state constitutional protections. Section C concludes by 
examining a successful challenge to a California school district’s use of LIFO, 
which may prove to be a model for similar challenges nationally. 
A. The Relationship Between Teachers and Student Achievement 
Teachers are the most prominent example of a skill-based education input. 
Ensuring equal and adequate access to quality teachers should be a focus for 
education reform litigants because academic research increasingly suggests 
that teacher quality is a critical variable in predicting a child’s academic 
achievement,139 often outweighing other variables typically linked to education 
outcomes. For example, individual teacher effectiveness140 has a more 
significant impact on student achievement than class size or homogeneity.141 In 
addition, curriculum and testing changes do not improve student achievement 
without effective teachers implementing the reforms.142 
 
 139 See, e.g., Jonah E. Rockoff, The Impact of Individual Teachers on Student Achievement: Evidence 
from Panel Data, 94 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 247, 251 (2004). 
 140 Teacher effectiveness is often measured through a value-added statistical model that uses students’ 
standardized test scores to determine the relative effectiveness of a teacher in increasing student scores. S. Paul 
Wright et al., Teacher and Classroom Context Effects on Student Achievement: Implications for Teacher 
Evaluation, 11 J. PERSONNEL EVALUATION EDUC. 57, 58 (1997). 
 141 Id. at 61–63. 
 142 Darling-Hammond, supra note 105, at 1079. 
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Demographic variables have traditionally been considered the most 
important factors in predicting student achievement.143 Nevertheless, teacher 
training and certification status have a stronger impact on student achievement 
than demographic variables, such as socioeconomic status, race, and language 
background.144 Demographic barriers can be surmounted by high-quality 
instruction from effective teachers.145 Students taught by unqualified and low-
quality teachers, however, show little academic achievement.146 Teacher 
quality also has a significant effect on a student’s long-term academic 
progress, and its impact on student achievement is cumulative over the 
years.147 In short, good teachers have a critical and long-lasting effect on their 
students’ success. 
School environment factors also influence teacher effectiveness to some 
extent. High teacher turnover at individual schools creates instructional 
instability and often forces a school to staff classes with low-quality 
teachers.148 Nevertheless, the school in which a teacher works does not 
necessarily determine his or her individual effectiveness.149 Effective teachers 
have the greatest impact on low-performing students and minorities,150 an 
important concern for education reform litigants. 
Quality teachers exhibit common traits. For example, the literacy level of 
individual teachers has a positive impact on teacher effectiveness.151 A 
teacher’s mastery of the content that she teaches is also strongly related to 
effectiveness.152 Teachers who have obtained a license or certification tend to 
be more effective,153 but this credential alone may not indicate an individual 
 
 143 The Coleman Report propagated the view that student background and socioeconomic status were the 
most significant variables affecting student achievement. See generally JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL., EQUALITY 
OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1966). 
 144 Darling-Hammond, supra note 120, at 1, 33. 
 145 Steven G. Rivkin et al., Teachers, Schools, and Academic Achievement, 73 ECONOMTERICA 417, 419 
(2005). 
 146 See Darling-Hammond, supra note 120, at 1, 23. 
 147 Julian Vasquez Heilig et al., Alternative Certification and Teach for America: The Search for High 
Quality Teachers, 20 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 388, 394 (2011). 
 148 Darling-Hammond, supra note 105, at 1107–08. 
 149 Rivkin et al., supra note 145, at 440. 
 150 Daniel Aaronson et al., Teachers and Student Achievement in the Chicago Public High Schools, 25 J. 
LAB. ECON. 95, 126–28 (2007). 
 151 HEATHER G. PESKE & KATI HAYCOCK, EDUC. TRUST, TEACHING INEQUALITY: HOW POOR AND 
MINORITY STUDENTS ARE SHORTCHANGED ON TEACHER QUALITY 8 (2006). 
 152 Id. (noting a strong connection between a teacher’s mastery of content and effectiveness in teaching 
students math and science). 
 153 Darling-Hammond, supra note 105, at 1078–79. 
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teacher’s success,154 and having more academic credentials does not ensure 
greater classroom effectiveness.155 Lastly, while experience correlates with 
teacher effectiveness at the start of a teacher’s career, once teachers have 
completed their first few years in the profession, experience has an 
insignificant impact on student achievement.156 
Given this evidence, education reform litigants seeking to increase equality 
and eliminate inadequacy should focus their efforts on policies that have a 
direct effect on student access to quality teachers. 
B. A Policy that Unequally Distributes Skill-Based Inputs: “Last in, First 
out” 
The procedures that school districts follow when implementing budget-
related layoffs have a direct effect on the distribution of teachers and staff 
turnover throughout a district. School districts often use a last-in, first-out 
procedure when they implement reduction-in-force (RIF) layoffs as part of 
district-wide budget cuts.157 In these circumstances, districts first determine the 
specific subject area or grade level where layoffs will occur.158 The teachers 
that fall within the targeted layoff pool are then ranked by seniority, and the 
teachers with the least amount of seniority are laid off until the necessary 
budgetary savings are met.159 Because teachers with less seniority earn lower 
salaries than more senior teachers, LIFO forces school districts to lay off a 
greater number of teachers in order to meet the targeted budgetary savings.160 
This results in even larger class sizes than would otherwise be necessary if 
fewer teachers were fired.161 
Supporters of seniority-based layoffs rely on several arguments in 
advocating for LIFO. First, proponents claim that layoffs based on seniority are 
objective and protect against unwarranted firings that used to plague the 
 
 154 Id. at 1084; see also PESKE & HAYCOCK, supra note 151, at 8. 
 155 Teachers with master’s degrees are no more effective than teachers without one. Rivkin et al., supra 
note 145, at 449. 
 156 NAT’L COUNCIL ON TEACHER QUALITY, TEACHER LAYOFFS: RETHINKING “LAST-HIRED, FIRST-FIRED” 
POLICIES 2 (2010); Rivkin et al., supra note 145, at 447. 
 157 NAT’L COUNCIL ON TEACHER QUALITY, supra note 156, at 3. 
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. 
 160 Dan Goldhaber & Roddy Theobald, Assessing the Determinants and Implications of Teacher Layoffs 5 
(Nat’l Ctr. for Analysis of Longitudinal Data in Educ. Research, Working Paper No. 55, 2010). 
 161 NAT’L COUNCIL ON TEACHER QUALITY, supra note 156, at 2. 
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schoolhouse.162 Second, LIFO prioritizes retaining teachers whom the school 
district has invested in through professional development over the years.163 
Third, LIFO protects education quality because more experienced teachers are 
better teachers.164 Despite these arguments, only the third rationale actually 
focuses on student achievement, which should be the key consideration in 
these circumstances. Additionally, challenges to the assumption that more 
senior teachers are better teachers have made the third rationale increasingly 
suspect.165 
Consequently, the use of LIFO has come under increasing attack in recent 
years.166 This animosity stems from the growing perception that LIFO leads to 
layoff decisions that completely ignore teacher effectiveness,167 which may 
undermine broader efforts at school reform.168 Under the policy, ineffective 
teachers who have worked in a school district for many years are retained over 
effective teachers who have only been on the job for a few years.169 As a result, 
journalists have criticized the practice,170 and current and former public 
officials have signaled their opposition to it.171 The opposition is not empty 
rhetoric; several state legislatures have taken steps to end the use of LIFO in 
determining teacher layoffs.172 
 
 162 CTR. FOR EDUC. ORG., WHAT’S MISSING FROM THE DEBATE ON SENIORITY? 1 (2011) (noting that 
teachers could be fired for becoming pregnant or because the principal disliked them before seniority-based 
protections were established).  
 163 Id. 
 164 NAT’L COUNCIL ON TEACHER QUALITY, supra note 156, at 2.  
 165 See, e.g., DONALD J. BOYD ET AL., URBAN INST., BRIEF NO. 12, TEACHER LAYOFFS: AN EMPIRICAL 
ILLUSTRATION OF SENIORITY VS. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS 2, 8 (2010); NAT’L COUNCIL ON TEACHER 
QUALITY, supra note 156, at 2; Rivkin et al., supra note 145, at 447; Goldhaber & Theobald, supra note 160, 
at 5. 
 166 See, e.g., Michael Barbaro & Nicholas Confessore, Bloomberg Presses Cuomo on Teacher Seniority 
Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2011, at A14; Barbara Martinez, White House Signals Opposition to “Last in, First 
out,” WALL ST. J. METROPOLIS BLOG (Mar. 3, 2011, 5:39 PM), http://blogs. wsj.com/metropolis/2011/03/03/ 
white-house-signals-opposition-to-last-in-first-out/; Michelle Rhee, End “Last in, First out” Teacher Layoffs, 
CNN (Feb. 23, 2011, 5:47 PM), http://www.cnn.com /2011/OPINION/02/23/rhee.layoff.policy/index.html. 
 167 THE NEW TEACHER PROJECT, THE CASE AGAINST QUALITY-BLIND TEACHER LAYOFFS 1–5 (2011) 
(noting that fourteen states prevent officials from considering anything other than seniority in layoff 
decisions). 
 168 ROBIN LAKE ET AL., CTR. ON REINVENTING PUB. EDUC., WILL SENIORITY-BASED LAYOFFS 
UNDERMINE SCHOOL IMPROVEMENT EFFORTS IN WASHINGTON STATE? (2011). 
 169 THE NEW TEACHER PROJECT, supra note 167, at 4. 
 170 See, e.g., Editorial, A Message for Andrew, N.Y. POST, Feb. 24, 2011, at 24; Jason Felch et al., 
Grading the Teachers, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2010, at A1. 
 171 Barbaro & Confessore, supra note 166; Martinez, supra note 166; Rhee, supra note 166. 
 172 April Hunt & Nancy Badertscher, Seniority Won’t Protect Teachers, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Apr. 12, 
2011, at 3B; Leslie Postal, Scott Signs Teacher Merit Pay into Law, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Mar. 25, 2011, at 
B1. 
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LIFO presents an opportunity for education reform litigants to branch out 
from classic education finance litigation. Three pressing reasons suggest that 
challenging LIFO in court is a good starting place for education reformers 
seeking to change policies that lead to unequal or inadequate distributions of 
skill-based education inputs. First, current budget shortfalls at the state level 
make it more likely that districts will need to lay off teachers.173 Second, the 
practice has a broad impact across the nation because most large school 
districts rely on LIFO when making layoff decisions.174 Lastly, many state 
legislatures have failed to meet their constitutional duty to provide an equal 
and adequate education system by either permitting or requiring school 
districts to use LIFO.175 Thus, the constitutional rights of students who might 
be adversely affected by LIFO are threatened by a policy that many state 
legislatures have failed to address properly. 
Perhaps most importantly for education reform litigants, LIFO implicates 
the concerns about race and socioeconomic status that have run through all 
three waves of school finance litigation and continue to cast a shadow over 
American education. Inexperienced and uncertified full-time teachers who lack 
seniority are disproportionately staffed in schools that serve low-income and 
minority communities.176 As a result, schools located in these communities not 
only risk losing some of their more effective teachers who have little seniority, 
 
 173 MARGARET L. PLECKI & MATTHEW FINSTER, EXAMINING THE IMPACT AND EQUITY OF SENIORITY-
BASED TEACHER LAYOFF NOTICES IN WASHINGTON STATE: 2008-09 TO 2009-10, at 1 (2010) (“In 2009, nearly 
60,000 teachers were laid off by districts using seniority as the primary determinant.” (citation omitted)); see 
also CTR. FOR EDUC. ORG., supra note 162, at 1. 
 174 See, e.g., Goldhaber & Theobald, supra note 160, at 3 (“[A]ll of the 75 largest school districts in the 
nation use seniority as a factor in layoff decisions, and seniority is the sole factor that determines the order of 
layoffs in over 70 percent of these districts.”); NAT’L COUNCIL ON TEACHER QUALITY, supra note 156, at 4. 
 175 THE NEW TEACHER PROJECT, supra note 167, at 2. But see CTR. FOR EDUC. ORG., supra note 162, at 1 
(noting several states that have recently passed laws prohibiting districts from relying on seniority in RIF 
decisions). 
 176 See BOYD ET AL., supra note 165, at 1, 8; PESKE & HAYCOCK, supra note 151; PLECKI & FINSTER, 
supra note 173, at 8; CRISTINA SEPE & MARGUERITE ROZA, CTR. ON REINVENTING PUB. EDUC., THE 
DISPROPORTIONATE IMPACT OF SENIORITY-BASED LAYOFFS ON POOR, MINORITY STUDENTS 1–5 (2010), 
available at http://www.crpe.org/publications/disproportionate-impact-seniority-based-layoffs-poor-minority-
students; Darling-Hammond, supra note 105, at 1051, 1101–09. In an analysis of seniority-based RIF notices 
handed out in Washington over a two-year period, schools at which teachers received RIF notices had a higher 
proportion of impoverished students than the district average in nine out of ten sample districts. In addition, 
schools at which teachers received RIF notices had a higher proportion of minority students than the district 
average in eight out of ten sample districts. PLECKI & FINSTER, supra note 173, at 8. 
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but also disproportionately risk enduring the destabilizing effects of high staff 
turnover.177 
Admittedly, LIFO might still spur some positive change because schools in 
low-income communities are not uniformly staffed by an arsenal of effective 
teachers. Therefore, ineffective instructors at low-income schools would also 
likely lose their jobs in a LIFO-based RIF. However, eliminating these less 
effective teachers in a RIF may still do more harm than good to academic 
achievement at schools serving low-income students. 
This harm stems from the destabilizing effect of high staff turnover. 
Principals may have to replace a mediocre teacher laid off in a RIF with a line 
of substitute teachers.178 These substitutes are not only less qualified than full-
time teachers, but the transient nature of their job also creates an air of 
instability in a classroom.179 Schools who lose fewer teachers in LIFO-based 
RIFs avoid this instability and the harm it causes to academic achievement.180 
Thus, LIFO leads to an unequal distribution of education benefits and 
disproportionately burdens schools in communities where students are already 
receiving an inadequate education. 
C. Successful Litigation: Reed v. State 
In 2010 a California court recognized the troublesome effect of LIFO on 
poor and minority communities. In a state where education finance litigants 
had previously enjoyed success,181 Reed v. State recognized that LIFO violates 
students’ state constitutional rights. The plaintiffs’ success in Reed is 
significant because it shows the promise of constitutional challenges to 
policies, like LIFO, that lead to an inequitable distribution of skill-based 
education inputs. This section proceeds by (1) detailing the facts underlying 
Reed, (2) summarizing the court’s analysis in the case, and (3) discussing the 
consequences of the court’s chosen remedy. 
 
 177 For example, Darling-Hammond noted that “[i]n some schools, almost always in districts with high 
proportions of low-income and minority students, the proportion of underqualified teachers exceeds 50%.” 
Darling-Hammond, supra note 105, at 1108; see also WILLIAM KOSKI & EILEEN L. HORNG, INST. FOR 
RESEARCH ON EDUC. POLICY & PRACTICE, CURBING OR FACILITATING INEQUALITY? LAW, COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING, AND TEACHER ASSIGNMENT AMONG SCHOOLS IN CALIFORNIA (2007). 
 178 Darling-Hammond, supra note 105, at 1107–08.  
 179 Id. at 1107–08; see also Reed v. State, No. BC432420, slip op. at 5–6 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. County 
May 13, 2010). 
 180 See Darling-Hammond, supra note 105, at 1107–08.  
 181 See, e.g., Butt v. State, 842 P.2d 1240, 1251, 1256 (Cal. 1992) (in bank); Serrano I, 487 P.2d 1241, 
1247–48 (Cal. 1971) (in bank). 
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1. Factual Background 
The Reed suit was brought in anticipation of a seniority-based RIF in the 
Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) at the end of the 2009–2010 
school year.182 The Reed plaintiffs brought a class action suit to enjoin LAUSD 
from using the RIF to lay off teachers at three middle schools in the district.183 
These schools shared three common characteristics: (1) the student populations 
were overwhelming composed of minority students, (2) the students were 
impoverished, and (3) academic achievement at the schools was unacceptably 
low.184 
At Gompers Middle School, with an enrollment of about 1,600 students, 
100% of the students were either black or Hispanic and 76% were 
economically disadvantaged.185 In the five years prior to the Reed lawsuit, 
fewer than 15% of the school’s students passed the state’s achievement test.186 
Markham Middle School enrolled about 1,500 students.187 Ninety-nine percent 
of its students were either black or Hispanic and 82% were economically 
disadvantaged.188 Fewer than 13% of Markham’s students had passed the 
state’s achievement test in the five years before the lawsuit.189 Approximately 
1,900 students attended Liechty Middle School, and 100% of them were 
minority students.190 Ninety percent of Liechty’s students were economically 
disadvantaged.191 Fewer than 24% of the school’s students had passed the 
state’s achievement test in the two years before suit was brought.192 These 
statistics show the plaintiffs’ schools educated an overwhelmingly vulnerable 
group of minority students. 
 
 182 Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 24, Reed v. State, No. BC432420 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
L.A. County Feb. 24, 2010). 
 183 Id. at 7–8. 
 184 Id. at 9–10. 
 185 Id. at 9. Economic disadvantage is typically determined based on whether a student qualifies for the 
federal government’s free and reduced-price school lunch program. To be eligible, a student’s family must be 
living near the poverty level. National School Lunch Program, U.S. DEPARTMENT AGRIC. FOOD & NUTRITION 
SERVICE (Aug. 2012), http://www.fns.usda.gov/cnd/lunch/aboutlunc h/NSLPFactSheet.pdf. 
 186 Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, supra note 182, at 9. 
 187 Id. at 10. 
 188 Id. 
 189 Id. 
 190 Id. at 9. 
 191 Id. at 10. 
 192 Id. Liechty had only been open for two years before the Reed litigation. Id. 
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These three schools also had a disproportionate number of teachers with 
little seniority. The average Gompers teacher had five years of experience.193 
At Markham, the average teacher had 7.2 years of experience.194 That figure 
was only 3.5 years at Liechty.195 In contrast, the average LAUSD teacher had 
11.6 years of experience.196 Thus, a LIFO-based RIF would disproportionately 
threaten the less-senior teaching staff at Gompers, Markham, and Liechty. 
The threat that these three schools could lose a disproportionate number of 
teachers had already been realized at the end of the previous school year 
(2008–2009), when LAUSD implemented a district-wide RIF based on LIFO 
that devastated the plaintiffs’ schools.197 Seventy-two percent of the teachers at 
Liechty lost their jobs in the RIF, resulting in twenty-six vacant positions at the 
school.198 At Gompers, LAUSD fired 51% of the teaching staff, creating 
thirteen vacancies at the school.199 LAUSD fired 57% of the teachers at 
Markham based solely on seniority, creating eighteen vacancies at the school 
for the following year.200 In comparison, other middle schools within LAUSD 
lost fewer than 10% of their teachers from the RIF.201 
The turnover at the plaintiffs’ schools weakened the quality of education 
available to students.202 Although all three schools had instituted reforms to 
minimize staff turnover,203 these reforms were meaningless in light of the 
RIF.204 Instead of retaining teachers who had experience teaching in 
challenging environments and had developed trusting relationships with the 
schools’ students, administrators at these schools were forced to bring in 
replacements who did not want to teach at their schools and often quit soon 
after starting.205 The schools were forced to rely on substitute teachers to fill 
vacancies as a result.206 
 
 193 Id. 
 194 Id. 
 195 Id. 
 196 Id. 
 197 Id. at 12. 
 198 Id. at 12–13. Though twenty-one Liechty teachers were rehired by the school as long-term substitutes, 
twenty-six vacancies remained. Id. at 13. 
 199 Id. at 13. Though twenty teachers had to be replaced, seven teachers were rehired as long-term 
substitutes. Id.  
 200 Id. 
 201 Id. at 23. 
 202 Id. at 12–23. 
 203 Id. at 10–11. 
 204 Id. at 12–23. 
 205 Id. at 13. 
 206 Id. at 14–16. 
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Instructional consistency was nonexistent, as some classes were taught by a 
string of up to ten rotating substitutes during the first few months of school.207 
These substitutes were often unqualified, failed to teach the subject matter of 
the course, or taught the same material over and over.208 With so many 
different substitutes teaching classes, coherent lesson planning and records of 
student progress were absent.209 All the turnover made it very difficult for the 
administration to provide support to new teachers and ensure that students 
were learning.210 The instability following the threat of mass layoffs 
undermined classroom instruction and discipline.211 
Some of the most effective teachers and leaders at the schools were lost in 
the RIF. A “Teacher of the Year” nominee at Gompers was laid off,212 and the 
school lost several teachers who served as department chairs.213 At Liechty, a 
teacher who had raised student literacy scores by 1.5 grade levels was laid 
off.214 These were teachers who had “learned about the students, built 
relationships with them, and gained experience in what strategies and 
approaches work with the students at the school.”215 
In light of the harm caused by the 2008–2009 RIF, the Reed plaintiffs 
brought their suit in February 2010 to enjoin further layoffs at their schools 
after the LAUSD superintendent announced a projection that 7,500 to 8,500 
teachers would be laid off in a RIF at the end of the 2009–2010 school year.216 
2. Judicial Analysis 
California’s constitution guarantees public school students a fundamental 
right to equality of educational opportunity.217 In Reed, the superior court 
found the negative impact of LIFO analogous to previous instances in which 
the state had harmed students’ rights to equal educational opportunities.218 The 
 
 207 Id. at 15. 
 208 Id. 
 209 Id. 
 210 Id. at 19 (noting Markham only had four teaching coaches to support forty-three classrooms taught by 
new teachers or rotating substitutes). 
 211 Id. at 20–21. 
 212 Id. at 17. 
 213 Id. at 20. 
 214 Id. at 17. 
 215 Id. at 19. 
 216 Id. at 24, 28–29. 
 217 Butt v. State, 842 P.2d 1240, 1251, 1256 (Cal. 1992) (in bank). 
 218 Reed v. State, No. BC432420, slip op. at 1–2 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. County May 13, 2010). 
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court focused a substantial amount of its opinion on the harms to the plaintiffs’ 
educational opportunities at the hands of LIFO.219 
Observing that the plaintiffs’ schools had already failed to provide a quality 
education before the RIFs, the court began by outlining the unequal effect on 
plaintiffs’ schools resulting from a LIFO-based RIF.220 LIFO’s disparate 
impact on the plaintiffs’ schools was important to the court because it found “a 
distinct relationship between high teacher turnover and the quality of 
educational opportunities afforded.”221 In short, the court found that “[h]igh 
teacher turnover devastates educational opportunity.”222 The court’s statement 
acknowledged that LIFO created unequal access to a skill-based education 
input—a stable teaching staff—that had a clear relationship with educational 
opportunity. 
A clear connection existed between the RIF-induced turnover at the 
plaintiffs’ schools and restrictions on the students’ educational opportunities. 
The court highlighted the fact that replacement teachers were often assigned to 
teach subjects beyond the scope of their certification or training223 and quit 
after only a few days on the job.224 The court also agreed that rotating 
substitutes through a classroom has devastating repercussions for classroom 
learning.225 The use of rotating substitutes meant that “little to no instruction 
took place” in the affected classrooms and students “miss[ed] instruction on 
key topics in core academic subjects.”226 Thus, the court held that the RIF had 
a “real and appreciable impact on Plaintiffs’ fundamental right to equal 
educational opportunity.”227 
Applying strict scrutiny, the court indicated sensitivity to the California 
legislature’s determination that layoffs should proceed based on seniority, yet 
still found no compelling state interest to justify the infringement on the 
plaintiffs’ fundamental right.228 California’s Education Code only provided for 
 
 219 Id. at 2–7. 
 220 Id. at 3–4. 
 221 Id. at 4. 
 222 Id. 
 223 Id. The court emphasized the claim by the plaintiffs’ expert witness that “[t]he overall proportion of 
correctly assigned teachers is ‘the most significant predictor of state-level average student achievement in 
mathematics and reading.’” Id. at 5 (emphasis added). 
 224 Id. at 3. 
 225 Id. at 5.  
 226 Id. 
 227 Id. at 6–7. 
 228 Id. at 7. 
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qualified seniority rights in teacher layoffs, and it “allow[ed] deviations [from 
strict seniority layoffs] for pedagogical needs and constitutional interests.”229 
The court held that LAUSD’s use of LIFO violated California’s guarantee of 
equal protection of the laws, and LAUSD was compelled to deviate from strict 
seniority-based layoffs in order to protect the constitutional rights of the 
plaintiffs.230 As a result, the court granted the plaintiffs’ requested 
injunction.231 
3. Remedy and Aftermath 
The Reed plaintiffs’ victory prevented RIF-related layoffs at the plaintiffs’ 
schools and led to a landmark settlement.232 The settlement was not limited to 
the plaintiffs’ schools, but focused on twenty-five schools that were in the 
bottom 30% in LAUSD in terms of academic achievement, had high rates of 
teacher turnover, and were demonstrating measurable academic 
improvement.233 
The terms of the agreement addressed four different measures.234 First, the 
settlement required LAUSD to provide additional support and resources to the 
targeted schools to improve educational stability and quality.235 Second, 
LAUSD agreed not to fire teachers at the targeted schools as part of any 
budget-based layoffs for the 2010–2011 school year.236 Third, any additional 
 
 229 Id. 
 230 Id. at 7–9. 
 231 Id. at 9–10. 
 232 See Reed v. State, No. BC432420 (Cal. Super. Ct. approving final settlement Feb. 8, 2011), rev’d sub 
nom. Reed v. United Teachers L.A., 145 Cal. Rptr. 3d 454 (Ct. App. 2012). Over the objections of the Los 
Angeles teachers union (UTLA), the students, LAUSD, and the Mayor’s Partnership for Los Angeles Schools 
agreed to this settlement. Reed, et al. v. State of California (2012), LIEBERT CASSIDY WHITMORE, 
http://www.lcwlegal.com/79907 (last visited June 30, 2013) [hereinafter Reed Summary]. The superior court 
conducted a fairness hearing and entered a consent decree approving the settlement. Reed, 145 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 
457. UTLA appealed the judgment, arguing that judicial approval of the settlement violated the federal due 
process rights of its members absent a trial on the merits. Id. UTLA was successful on appeal, and the matter 
has been remanded for an adjudication of the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims on the merits. Id. at 466.  
 233 Reed v. State, No. BC432420, slip op. at 8–9 (Cal. Super. Ct. approving final settlement Feb. 8, 2011), 
rev’d sub nom. Reed v. United Teachers L.A., 145 Cal. Rptr. 3d 454 (Ct. App. 2012). The three schools 
attended by the Reed plaintiffs were included in this group of schools. The settlement also allowed for the 
district to consider an additional twenty schools that might be vulnerable to high levels of turnover. Id. 
 234 Id. at 9–11.  
 235 Id. at 9–10. The provision required LAUSD to collaborate with the schools and teachers union to fill 
vacancies at the schools, ensure that teachers hired were credentialed in the subject they were to teach, develop 
retention incentives at the targeted schools, and continually share the challenges and successes of these 
changes with the parties. Id.  
 236 Id. at 10.  
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RIF notices would be sent out based on seniority, but only to schools that were 
receiving fewer RIF notices than the average LAUSD school.237 Fourth, the 
parties agreed that the court would retain jurisdiction to resolve future disputes 
and would hold yearly status conferences through 2013.238 This settlement 
notably went far beyond the scope of the remedy that the court originally 
granted, which merely enjoined budget-based layoffs at Gompers, Markham, 
and Leichty.239 
Education reform litigants can learn important lessons from Reed. First, the 
case demonstrates that litigants do not need to focus narrowly on school 
finance challenges; the jurisprudence developed through school finance 
litigation may proscribe policies, such as LIFO, that cause an unequal or 
inadequate distribution of skill-based inputs. Second, Reed shows that courts 
are willing to recognize the important role that skill-based education inputs, 
particularly teacher quality and instructional stability, play in students’ 
constitutional education rights. Third, Reed illustrates how remedies that focus 
on the policy of a particular school district, as opposed to a statewide system of 
education finance, are more manageable for courts to devise. Lastly, the 
litigation illustrates how a limited remedy, here an injunction and declaration 
that a practice has unconstitutional effects at three schools, can spur settlement 
discussions, leading to policy changes and improvements in education equality 
and adequacy for a much broader group of students.240 
An important remaining question, however, is whether similar challenges 
are viable in states other than California, given differences in state 
constitutional jurisprudence.241 Part IV addresses this question. 
IV.  THE VIABILITY OF REED-LIKE CHALLENGES BEYOND CALIFORNIA 
The themes and concerns from education finance cases in other states 
indicate that Reed-like suits, challenging local policies that cause an unequal or 
 
 237 Id. This provision was intended to “ensure that any impact from preserving teacher positions at the 
targeted schools is fairly dispersed among other LAUSD schools that can more readily absorb turnover.” Id. 
 238 Id. at 11.  
 239 Reed v. State, No. BC432420, slip op. at 9–10 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. County May 13, 2010). 
 240 While the appellate decision requiring an adjudication on the merits was certainly a setback for the 
parties’ agreement in Reed, the initial injunction still brought key stakeholders together to discuss reforming a 
district-wide policy that was infringing upon the students’ right to equal educational opportunity. See Reed 
Summary, supra note 232 (noting that “the students, the Mayor's Partnership, LAUSD, and UTLA attempted 
to negotiate a settlement” in the months after the superior court issued its injunction). 
 241 California has proven to be a pioneering state for education reform litigants. The first wave of school 
finance litigation began there in 1971. See Thro, supra note 16, at 601 n.22. 
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inadequate distribution of skill-based education inputs, should be cognizable in 
states other than California. Part IV looks at education finance cases from 
various states to demonstrate why Reed-type suits show promise throughout 
the country. Section A uses finance cases from West Virginia and Connecticut, 
two states that have struck down school finance systems on equal protection 
grounds, to show that Reed-type claims should be cognizable in states that 
have struck down finance systems based on equal protection guarantees. 
Section B looks to two decisions where courts struck down school finance 
schemes under state constitution education articles to demonstrate that Reed-
type claims also would be broadly viable in states that struck down school 
finance schemes under state education articles. Finally, because many states 
that have found against education finance plaintiffs did so on justiciability 
grounds, section C discusses why Reed-like claims present fewer justiciability 
concerns than school finance suits. This suggests that these claims may see 
even more widespread success than school finance suits have enjoyed. 
A. States that Struck Down Education Finance Schemes on Equal Protection 
Grounds 
Courts in states that struck down school finance systems as violative of 
state equal protection guarantees would likely overturn policies, like LIFO, 
that lead to an inequitable distribution of skill-based education inputs. This 
outcome is likely because of the strict scrutiny that courts would probably 
apply to such policies in these states. West Virginia and Connecticut serve as 
illustrative examples. 
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, in Pauley v. Kelly, held that 
education was a fundamental right under the state’s constitution.242 
Accordingly, the court found strict scrutiny appropriate for discriminatory 
classifications in education financing.243 The court emphasized that mere 
funding equality was not the true goal,244 noting that “[e]qual protection, 
applied to education, must mean an equality in substantive educational 
offerings and results, no matter what the expenditure may be.”245 These 
statements, coupled with the court’s observation that “excellence was the goal” 
 
 242 255 S.E.2d 859, 878 (W. Va. 1979). 
 243 Id. 
 244 Id. at 882 (“[The] constitutional mandate requires something more than a mere equality of educational 
funding to the counties.”). 
 245 Id. at 865 n.7. 
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the framers had in mind when crafting the state’s education clause,246 indicate 
that policies causing significant disparities in educational outcomes would be 
vulnerable in West Virginia courts. 
Connecticut was another state to strike down its school finance system on 
equal protection grounds after the state’s supreme court held that education 
was a fundamental right in Horton v. Meskill.247 Like the court in Reed, the 
Connecticut Supreme Court was concerned with whether students had “equal 
[educational] opportunity,”248 and held that its school financing system was 
unconstitutional because it led students in poorer communities to receive an 
education inferior to that received by students in wealthier districts.249 Given 
the focus in Horton on ensuring the right to equal educational opportunity, and 
Reed’s illustration of how a policy like LIFO creates unequal educational 
opportunities, Connecticut courts would likely find that inequitable access to 
skill-based education inputs infringes students’ fundamental rights. 
Accordingly, local policies, such as LIFO, would receive strict judicial 
scrutiny, making it more likely that a Connecticut court would strike down the 
policies. 
Overall, the judicial analysis in Pauley and Horton is similar to the analysis 
that courts would apply in other states, such as Wyoming,250 where education 
is a fundamental right or wealth is a suspect classification. As a result, local 
policies that cause an inequitable distribution of skill-based education 
resources should be equally vulnerable in these other states that struck down 
school finance systems under strict scrutiny. 
B. States that Struck Down Education Finance Schemes as Violative of State 
Education Clauses 
Reed-like challenges would also likely be cognizable in states that have 
struck down school finance schemes under their education clauses. LIFO and 
similar policies may be vulnerable because courts in these states have 
interpreted their constitutions’ education clauses expansively.251 Section B 
presents Kentucky and Texas as examples of states where Reed-type claims 
 
 246 Id. at 867. 
 247 376 A.2d 359, 374 (Conn. 1977). 
 248 Id. 
 249 Id. 
 250 See Washakie Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 333 (Wyo. 1980). 
 251 See, e.g., McDuffy v. Sec’y of the Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993). 
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may have a strong chance of prevailing based on education clauses that courts 
have interpreted broadly. 
In Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc.,252 the Kentucky Supreme 
Court held that the state’s school finance system was not efficient within the 
meaning of the state constitution and broadly struck down the state’s entire 
education system.253 The court interpreted the state’s education clause 
expansively to require that the legislature provide “equal educational 
opportunities” for all children, “regardless of place of residence or economic 
circumstances.”254 Significantly, the court in Rose observed that its education 
clause jurisprudence implicated policies beyond simple funding.255 The court 
stated that Kentucky’s education clause includes a “prohibition against any 
practice which ‘impairs the equal benefit of the common-school system’ to all 
students.”256 Consequently, Reed-type challenges would likely be promising 
for education reform litigants in Kentucky, since the state’s education clause 
has been interpreted to prohibit any policy that inhibits equal educational 
opportunities. 
Texas is another state that could recognize local challenges to the unequal 
distribution of skill-based education inputs under its education clause. The 
Texas Supreme Court has held that the state’s constitutional mandate of an 
“efficient” system of schools requires a system that provides equal educational 
opportunities without gross disparities.257 The court has also indicated that the 
“general diffusion of knowledge” provision in the education clause creates an 
obligation to equalize educational opportunities, without limiting the 
equalization mandate to money.258 Because Texas’s education clause requires 
equalized educational opportunity, gross disparities in the availability of skill-
based education inputs would likely be susceptible to constitutional challenge 
in Texas. 
 
 252 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989). 
 253 Id. at 215 (“This decision covers the creation of local school districts, school boards, and the Kentucky 
Department of Education . . . . It covers school construction and maintenance, teacher certification—the whole 
gamut of the common school system in Kentucky.”).  
 254 Id. at 212. 
 255 Id. at 206. 
 256 Id. (quoting Major v. Cayce, 33 S.W. 93, 95 (1895)) (emphasis added). 
 257 Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 396–97 (Tex. 1989). 
 258 Id. at 395–97 (“The present [school finance] system, by contrast, provides not for a diffusion that is 
general, but for one that is limited and unbalanced. The resultant inequalities are thus directly contrary to the 
constitutional vision of efficiency.”). 
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Kentucky and Texas are only two of the many states that have interpreted 
their education clauses expansively when overturning school finance 
schemes.259 Given these robust interpretations and the diminished justiciability 
concerns in Reed-type suits,260 other states that have overturned school finance 
systems under their education clauses would likely recognize Reed-type claims 
as well. 
C. Diminished Justiciability Concerns 
State courts that have refused to strike down school finance schemes have 
often justified their decisions on justiciability grounds.261 However, because 
Reed-like suits raise fewer justiciability concerns than school finance 
challenges, previously unwilling states may be more likely to decide these 
types of suits on the merits.262 Four features of finance suits set them apart 
from claims related to the local distribution of skill-based resources. 
First, although courts have recognized the legislature’s exclusive control 
over budgetary decisions,263 finance suits directly challenge the legislature’s 
appropriations choices. As a result, finance suits implicate the first and fourth 
Baker factors,264 making these claims seem like nonjusticiable political 
questions. A political question is not present in Reed-like suits, however, 
because these challenges do not require courts to decide whether a legislature 
has appropriated enough money for education. Courts need only decide 
whether resources have been distributed according to constitutional 
requirements, as the Reed injunction demonstrates, without commenting on the 
 
 259 See, e.g., Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806 (Ariz. 1994) (en banc); 
McDuffy v. Sec’y of the Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993); Abbott v. Burke (Abbott II), 
575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990); Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1993); Seattle Sch. 
Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978) (en banc). 
 260 See infra Part IV.C. 
 261 See, e.g., Coal. for Adequacy & Fairness in Sch. Funding, Inc. v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 1996) 
(per curiam); Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178 (Ill. 1996); Neb. Coal. for Educ. Equity & 
Adequacy v. Heineman, 731 N.W.2d 164 (Neb. 2007); City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40 (R.I. 1995). 
 262 Nevertheless, plaintiffs may still confront insurmountable obstacles from a state’s specific 
constitutional language and jurisprudence. Rhode Island is one such state. Its education clause only requires 
the state assembly to “promote public schools” and the state’s supreme court will only invalidate laws that 
violate a constitutional provision beyond a reasonable doubt. Sundlun, 662 A.2d at 44–45, 47. 
 263 See, e.g., Chiles, 680 So. 2d at 406–07; Heineman, 731 N.W.2d at 181–82. 
 264 These factors are “a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate 
political department” and “the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without 
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government.” Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 
(1962). 
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overall level of education funding.265 Accordingly, suits contesting the unequal 
distribution of skill-based inputs allow the judiciary to avoid showing a lack of 
respect for the legislature by intruding on the appropriations power, which has 
been textually committed to the Legislative Branch. 
Second, Reed-like claims do not create the same potential for popular 
backlash266 that was associated with finance litigation and the mass 
redistribution of tax dollars necessary to equalize education funding throughout 
a state. The aftermath of the plaintiffs’ victory in the Serrano II267 education 
finance decision illustrates the potential unintended consequences of a court 
striking down a finance scheme. After the California Supreme Court held in 
Serrano II that variations in general district expenditures could not exceed one 
hundred dollars throughout California, the state assembly passed legislation to 
comply with the court’s holding.268 The enacted legislation, Assembly Bill 65, 
limited expenditures by districts with property-rich tax bases and transferred 
revenue obtained from property taxes in wealthier districts to poorer 
districts.269 However, before the bill could come into force, Californians passed 
a constitutional amendment through Proposition 13 that created a permanent 
cap on property taxes, which funded local schools.270 
Some scholars have argued that Serrano II was responsible for the passage 
of Proposition 13.271 In the wake of the equalization mandate of Serrano II, 
spending between districts became relatively equal, but at a substantially lower 
rate of overall spending because of Proposition 13.272 The quality of public 
education throughout California suffered because of this backlash.273 
 
 265 See Reed v. State, No. BC432420, slip op. at 8 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. County May 13, 2010) (“[The 
court] is mindful that this remedy may force LAUSD to layoff [sic] teachers at other schools. Moreover, the 
Court is mindful of the fact that it cannot simply order Defendants to produce additional funds to prevent 
further layoffs.”). 
 266 For a broader discussion of backlash, see, for example, JEFFREY M. SHAMAN, EQUALITY AND LIBERTY 
IN THE GOLDEN AGE OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 243–53 (2008); Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard 
Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607 (2000); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Essay, 
Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373 (2007); Cass R. 
Sunstein, If People Would Be Outraged by Their Rulings, Should Judges Care?, 60 STAN. L. REV. 155 (2007). 
 267 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976) (in bank). 
 268 Fischel, supra note 122, at 611. 
 269 Id. 
 270 Id. at 612.  
 271 See id. at 608–09. 
 272 See id. at 613. 
 273 See id. 
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Popular backlash is less likely to result from court judgments in suits 
addressing the local distribution of skill-based education resources. First, as 
Serrano II and Proposition 13 indicate, taxpayers are particularly sensitive to 
government action that reaches into their pockets and redistributes locally 
raised funds throughout the state. This sensitivity is evident from the 
comments of a California legislator, who observed: “[Proposition 13] is the 
revenge of wealth against the poor. ‘If the schools must actually be equal,’ they 
are saying, ‘then we’ll undercut them all.’”274 Because suits related to the local 
distribution of skill-based education inputs do not concern the redistribution of 
tax dollars throughout a state, there is less potential for public backlash after 
Reed-like decisions. 
The potential for backlash is also diminished in Reed-like suits because the 
number of parties affected by a court decision is likely to be more limited than 
in finance cases. For example, the Reed injunction directly impacted families 
with children attending three specific Los Angeles schools and local interest 
groups, like the Los Angeles teachers union. In contrast, the judgment in 
Serrano II affected property owners throughout California. Since Reed-type 
claims affect fewer groups than finance suits, there will be fewer parties who 
may become angry and protest over an adverse decision. Finally, because the 
number of impacted parties is smaller in Reed-type suits, courts may be able to 
minimize any potential backlash by involving the parties when devising a 
judicial remedy, the subject of the next part of this Comment. 
A third reason why these suits present fewer justiciability problems is that 
Reed-like claims raise fewer concerns about the judiciary’s institutional 
competence to decide claims on the merits. Reed-type suits have a much more 
limited scope than education finance cases because they concern distribution 
decisions made at the local, rather than state, level. This limits the scope of the 
policy choices courts must keep in mind when deciding whether they should 
decide a case on the merits. For example, deciding a challenge to a state school 
finance scheme may force courts to balance resources across policy domains. 
If a court tells the legislature it must spend more money on education, it may 
be indirectly forcing the legislature to spend less on things like transportation 
infrastructure or health benefits for state employees. 
In contrast, Reed-type claims do not force courts to balance resources 
across policy domains. Reed-type suits focus on resource distribution within a 
 
 274 JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA’S SCHOOLS 220 (1991). 
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specific policy area—education. Accordingly, in Reed, the court’s holding only 
affected education resources, or more specifically, which schools would lose 
teachers within a school district.275 It did not force the local government to 
spend less money on something like hospital construction, or to raise taxes to 
make more money available to retain teachers. 
The judicial inquiry in a Reed-type suit is also much less complex than the 
inquiry necessary in a school finance challenge. For example, the Wyoming 
Supreme Court has acknowledged the complexity of assessing whether a 
statewide education finance policy meets the state’s constitutional requirement 
of equality: 
We are well aware that the formula that will provide equality will be 
quite complex. More money may be needed in one school district to 
achieve quality education than in another because of, e.g., 
transportation costs, building maintenance costs, construction costs, 
logistic considerations, number of pupils with special problems, et 
cetera.276 
In contrast to this expansive investigation of every school district in a state, the 
court in Reed only had to look at three specific middle schools within Los 
Angeles.277 Thus, the judicial inquiry in a Reed-type case is much more 
limited. Because Reed-like suits are more restricted in scope and complexity, 
they are less likely to result in multiple rounds and years of litigation, a 
justification courts have used to hold that finance suits are nonjusticiable.278 
Lastly, courts may be more likely to decide Reed-like suits on the merits 
because there is a greater chance that judicial action will be able to remedy a 
constitutional wrong. Since skill-based education inputs are strongly correlated 
with student achievement,279 judicial action is more likely to have a positive 
impact on educational outcomes in these types of suits. This contrasts with the 
ambiguous record of school finance suits, in which plaintiffs’ victories have 
not always led to an equalization or raising of academic outcomes.280 
Part IV has shown that Reed-like suits have a viable future in states that 
have previously granted victories to school finance plaintiffs. Moreover, the 
 
 275 Reed v. State, No. BC432420, slip op. at 9 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. County May 13, 2010). 
 276 Washakie Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 315 n.3 (Wyo. 1980). 
 277 See Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, supra note 182, at 1. 
 278 See Neb. Coal. for Educ. Equity & Adequacy v. Heineman, 731 N.W.2d 164, 182–83 (Neb. 2007). 
 279 See supra Part III.A. 
 280 See Fischel, supra note 122, at 614; see also supra text accompanying notes 112–18.  
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features that distinguish Reed-like suits from finance suits suggest that even 
courts that have dismissed finance suits as nonjusticiable may be willing to 
decide these claims on the merits. Given this potential for greater judicial 
intervention, courts need to consider carefully the remedies they will grant if 
they find in favor of plaintiffs. This concern is the subject of the final Part of 
this Comment. 
V. REMEDYING DISPARITIES IN SKILL-BASED EDUCATION INPUTS 
In protecting the constitutional rights of children, a court’s choice of 
remedy can have a substantial impact on the long-term educational 
opportunities available to vulnerable students. For example, declaratory relief 
labeling a practice unconstitutional has significant moral force that may lead to 
positive change, yet such a declaration may offer little practical relief to 
students if policy changes are not implemented quickly and in a way that 
effectively eliminates the rights violation. In contrast, if courts are too heavy-
handed in granting relief, they create an opportunity for groups who favor the 
policies at issue to stir up popular backlash against the court’s decision. In the 
end, this may lead to greater resistance to policy change, cause courts to be less 
likely to find against policies because they fear a loss of credibility, and 
ultimately have an adverse impact on the long-term academic interests of poor, 
minority students.281 Accordingly, courts should carefully consider the 
potential consequences of the kinds of relief they may grant. 
Part V proceeds in two sections. Section A proposes that courts initially 
limit their intervention to declaratory relief, so long as there is minimal risk 
that institutional actors will drag their feet in implementing a change in policy. 
Section B addresses what courts should do when they perceive that education 
stakeholders or policy makers may try to resist reform, ultimately concluding 
that declaratory relief should be coupled with injunctive relief in those 
circumstances. 
Before discussing remedies in greater detail, a caveat is in order. This 
Comment does not suggest, with respect to LIFO, that courts should entirely 
disregard the role that seniority can play in personnel decisions. Additionally, 
this Comment does not argue that courts should cast aside employee rights 
bargained for in union contracts. These are legitimate considerations that 
courts should take into account when crafting a remedy. Nevertheless, courts 
 
 281 See Sunstein, supra note 266, at 170–71. 
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must ultimately remember that these considerations cannot be rigidly followed 
at the expense of constitutional rights. 
A. Preference for Declaratory Relief 
Courts trying to remedy Reed-like violations should begin by offering 
plaintiffs declaratory relief. The clear act of declaring a practice 
unconstitutional can spur prompt action by legislative and executive actors to 
remedy the wrong. For example, after the Massachusetts Supreme Court held 
that the state’s school finance scheme violated the state constitution,282 the 
state legislature took three days to pass the Education Reform Act of 1993, 
which was intended to bring the state’s funding scheme in line with the court’s 
holding.283 In another instance, the Kentucky legislature passed the Kentucky 
Education Reform Act of 1990, which completely restructured the state’s 
entire education system, less than a year after the state’s supreme court held 
that the entire system was unconstitutional.284 While the swift corrective action 
in Massachusetts and Kentucky was atypical in the context of school finance 
litigation,285 one can reasonably expect legislative and executive actors to 
move quickly in remedying local Reed-like violations because the scope of the 
policies in question are much narrower than statewide school finance regimes. 
Several other reasons suggest that declaratory relief alone may spur swift 
policy change. First, a judicial declaration that a policy is unconstitutional has 
substantial moral force. Government officials may be uncomfortable sticking 
to an existing policy when the judiciary has labeled it unconstitutional. Second, 
declaratory relief has the potential to make the broader public aware that an 
extant policy violates the constitution. This may lead to increased public 
pressure on policy makers to make changes, especially when a child’s 
education is at stake. Third, declaratory relief might provide additional support 
to public officials who have been trying to change existing policies, but have 
encountered resistance from other stakeholders who oppose change. The 
declaratory relief may serve as the additional justification these officials need 
to secure passage of their reforms. 
 
 282 McDuffy v. Sec’y of the Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993). 
 283 Sonja Ralston Elder, Note, Standing Up to Legislative Bullies: Separation of Powers, State Courts, 
and Educational Rights, 57 DUKE L.J. 755, 775 (2007). 
 284 Id. at 774–75. 
 285 See Molly A. Hunter, All Eyes Forward: Public Engagement and Educational Reform in Kentucky, 28 
J.L. & EDUC. 485, 498–99 (1999). 
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Another benefit of declaratory relief is that such limited holdings temper 
claims that the judiciary is usurping legislative power. Limiting judicial action 
to declaratory relief is responsive to justiciability concerns because such relief 
is the least intrusive on legislative and executive prerogatives. Declaratory 
relief only passes judgment on an existing policy. When a court only offers 
declaratory relief, it avoids giving directives to another branch of government 
on what specific steps that branch should take. Perhaps because of these 
benefits, several courts, mindful of justiciability concerns, have limited their 
intervention to declaratory relief in school finance cases.286 
Nevertheless, declaratory relief may be insufficient because the lack of 
specific judicial directives makes it challenging for legislators to determine 
how to change policies in a way that will satisfy constitutional requirements. 
This shortcoming is evident in states where plaintiff victories in school finance 
suits have created additional litigation that has lasted for years.287 Thus, while 
declaratory relief is a preferable first step in crafting a remedy because it 
displays sensitivity to justiciability concerns, it is an imperfect form of relief, 
and courts should not limit themselves to declaratory judgments simply to 
minimize claims of judicial legislating. 
B. The Danger of Delayed Reform and the Potential Need for Injunctive 
Relief 
Courts may need to grant both declaratory and injunctive relief in certain 
circumstances. Specifically, courts should not hesitate to grant injunctive 
relief, if needed to force swift policy change, because of the substantial harm 
that delayed action may cause. Having an ineffective teacher for a single 
school year has a considerable adverse impact on an individual student’s 
academic achievement, while a year with an effective teacher can help 
struggling students make academic strides.288 Thus, delayed reform creates 
 
 286 See, e.g., Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90, 95 (Ark. 1983) (quoting from Serrano II 
to note that the legislature has the duty of creating the state’s school system); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. 
Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 394, 399 (Tex. 1989) (refusing to instruct the legislature to enact specific legislation 
after declaring the state’s school finance scheme unconstitutional). 
 287 In New Jersey, the state supreme court struck down three legislative responses to the court’s 
declaration that the state’s education finance system was unconstitutional. The Texas Supreme Court has 
passed judgment on the constitutionality of the state’s school finance system six times since initially holding it 
unconstitutional. See Neb. Coal. for Educ. Equity & Adequacy v. Heineman, 731 N.W.2d 164, 182–83 (Neb. 
2007). 
 288 See, e.g., ROBERT GORDON ET AL., BROOKINGS INST., IDENTIFYING EFFECTIVE TEACHERS USING 
PERFORMANCE ON THE JOB 7–8 (2006); Daniel Aaronson et al., supra note 150, at 95. 
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serious potential for harm to vulnerable children. Additionally, action by 
organized interest groups, who favor policies like LIFO,289 may increase the 
potential for foot-dragging without the clear directives of injunctive relief. 
Courts should consider several factors when determining whether to grant 
injunctive relief in conjunction with declaratory relief. First, courts should look 
at the level of resistance to policy change from entrenched local interest 
groups. Organized resistance from teachers, administrators, school district 
officials, or parent groups may make it more difficult for policy makers to 
implement changes, so courts should be more willing to grant injunctive relief 
when organized resistance to policy change is strong. 
Second, courts should consider whether policy makers have already 
contemplated changing the policy in question before plaintiffs filed their 
lawsuit. If policy makers have already begun planning changes, injunctive 
relief may be less necessary to spur action and it may even interfere with the 
reform policy makers were already planning. 
Third, courts should consider the level of organization among local 
education reformers. If reform groups are well organized, they may be able to 
pressure policy makers to make quick reforms simply based on the declaratory 
relief. If this is the case, the extra push of injunctive relief may be unnecessary. 
Fourth, courts should look at the recent historical record of academic 
achievement within the local school district, or at the specific schools that the 
challenged policy affects the most. Consistently low levels of achievement 
may signal to a court that immediate action needs to be taken to mitigate any 
further harm to the educational opportunities of the relevant student 
population. As a result, injunctive relief may be more warranted when a school 
district has a history of low achievement. 
Finally, courts should keep in mind the complexity involved in making 
policy changes to prevent a constitutional violation because the political 
branches may need more flexibility in reforming complex policies. For 
example, the changes necessary in Reed to avoid a constitutional violation 
were straightforward. The school district simply had to protect teachers at a 
few specific schools from being laid off in a RIF. In contrast, the policy 
changes necessary in Abbeville County School District v. State were far more 
 
 289 See, e.g., Howard Blume & Jason Song, UTLA May Sue to Block Layoff Change, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 7, 
2010, at A1; Carl Campanile, Pro-LIFO Ads Blitzing Mike, N.Y. POST, Mar. 22, 2011, at 2. 
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substantial when the court required the school district to expand student access 
to preschool.290 That kind of change might require a school district to hire 
more teachers, adopt a new curriculum, and find space for additional classes. 
Injunctive relief requiring swift reform may be less appropriate when the 
necessary policy changes are complex because the use of specific judicial 
directives may make it more difficult for policy makers to implement reform. 
Injunctive relief may also have indirect and unintended benefits. By forcing 
school districts to take immediate action, injunctive relief may show litigants 
that courts will not act timidly in remedying Reed-like violations. This may 
lead school districts to take greater corrective action in response to an adverse 
decision. This potential scenario was evident in the settlement that emerged in 
Reed.291 The agreement created obligations for LAUSD to take protective 
measures at up to forty-five schools that were at risk of losing a 
disproportionate number of teachers from LIFO, even though students at only 
three of those schools had been parties to the litigation.292 
When determining the level of relief to grant plaintiffs, courts should 
initially limit themselves to declaratory relief. This limited intervention 
minimizes concerns about judicial overreaching. However, because of the 
importance of education rights and the significant risk of harm resulting from 
delayed reform, courts should not rule out granting injunctive relief in 
conjunction with declaratory judgments. The considerations discussed above 
provide courts with a starting point for determining when injunctive relief is 
appropriate. 
CONCLUSION 
The persistence of the achievement gap in American education is one of the 
most troubling and pressing problems our society confronts. Through their 
admirable efforts, education reform litigants have sought to eliminate this gap 
while highlighting the continued disparities in education. Nevertheless, forty 
years of finance litigation has not appreciably closed the achievement gap. A 
new approach is necessary. Children attending schools that fail to meet their 
unique needs deserve nothing less. 
 
 290 No. 93-CP-31-0169, slip op. at 161–62 (S.C. Ct. Com. Pl. Dec. 29, 2005). 
 291 Compare Reed v. State, No. BC432420 (Cal. Super. Ct. approving final settlement Feb. 8, 2011), rev’d 
sub nom. Reed v. United Teachers L.A., 145 Cal. Rptr. 3d 454 (Ct. App. 2012), with Reed v. State, No. 
BC432420, slip op. at 1 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. County May 13, 2010). 
 292 See Reed v. State, No. BC432420 (Cal. Super. Ct. approving final settlement Feb. 8, 2011). 
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In light of the shortcomings of education finance litigation, this Comment 
argues for a new approach that focuses on increasing and equalizing access to 
high-quality instructors and education professionals at the local school district 
level. This Comment explains why this new strategy is superior to the 
traditional approach of bringing education finance challenges. First, by 
focusing on education inputs that have a significant effect on academic 
outcomes, this new litigation would increase the chances that a judicial victory 
will translate to actual achievement gains in the classroom. Second, because 
these locally focused suits are more manageable for courts, this new litigation 
approach may reopen the courthouse doors to education reform plaintiffs in 
states that have refused to decide education finance cases on the merits. 
While this Comment focuses on LIFO as a policy to challenge under this 
new strategy, several other policies may also be appropriate targets for 
litigants. The use of combination classes and the lack of access to preschool 
programs are two other potential targets on the nonexhaustive list of policies 
this Comment suggests litigants should challenge. By shifting the focus of their 
litigation, education reform plaintiffs can play an even more important role in 
narrowing the achievement gap and meeting the mandate of education equality 
articulated in Brown and numerous state supreme court cases throughout the 
United States. 
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